The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XI | New York, Saturday, June 16, 1917 | Number 137

Contents

Editorial Notes 168

Leading Editorials
- What the Russian Government Wants 171
- The Industrial Truce 172
- Understanding Russia 174
- Trade War or Stable Peace 176

General Articles
- The Fatal Confusion ..... Norman Angell 178
- The Trouble with Musical Comedy .... Francis Hackett 180
- British Naval Changes ..... H. Sidebotham 182
- The Filibusters—Ten Weeks Later ..... Charles Merz 184

At the Capitol ..... C. M. 186

A Communication 187

Correspondence 189

Books and Things ..... P. L. 191

Reviews of Books
- Lawyers and Legalism ..... G. C. Henderson 192
- A German Rebel ..... H. S. 193
- Conrad's New Story ..... Q. K. 194

SINCE many Americans are wondering upon what theory the British government selected Lord Northcliffe as chief of its war staff in this country, it is worth while to attempt an explanation. The reason cannot be that, like Mr. Balfour, he would be particularly acceptable to American public opinion and the American government. Americans have short memories, but the administration can hardly forget the attitude of Lord Northcliffe's papers last December and January when the President undertook his diplomatic campaign for a better definition of the political purposes of the several belligerents. The London Times interpreted the December note as the product of a "particular type of American mind," as an impertinent interference by a well intentioned outsider in other people's business, and as in effect the stamping of the American government as the diplomatic accomplice of the Central Powers. The Allied nations were advised, consequently, to reply to the note with a stern refusal just as President Lincoln replied to all suggestions of interference by European governments in the Civil War. If the Allied nations had followed this advice and treated the American overture as it was treated by Germany, it would subsequently have been far more difficult for Mr. Wilson to make an irresistible case for American entrance into the war on the basis of full coöperation with the Allies; and as a matter of fact Lord Northcliffe has always been lukewarm about the intrusion of this country into the councils of the Allied nations. He feared American influence might count in favor of moderate peace terms.

IN view of the foregoing considerations Lord Northcliffe could not have been appointed because he sympathized with the attitude of the American administration and American public opinion towards the underlying political purposes of the war. Neither could he have been appointed for the purpose of modifying the American attitude in order to make it resemble that of the London Times or the Daily Mail. For, of course, he cannot attempt while here to bring any direct influence to bear on American public opinion. In fact, he probably received his appointment, not because he was particularly fitted to represent Great Britain in this country, but because for an obvious reason it was convenient to transform him into a public official. Until his appointment he was the most powerful private individual in the United Kingdom. Through his papers he exercised an enormous influence upon British opinion. He made and unmade ministers and Cabinets. His support seemed to be as indispensable to the Lloyd George government as that of the House of Commons. He may, consequently, have had himself appointed; and whether he did so or not, the British government may well have rejoiced at the opportunity of installing him in a public office situated in a foreign country. Unlike other king-makers Lord Northcliffe has been willing to become the servant of the government, created in part by him, and since it may be very useful to the British government to have him as a servant rather than as a guide, Americans as loyal allies would be churlish to object. We well know how desirable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it is at times to appoint powerful individuals to foreign missions in order to keep them loyal supporters of the government at home.

CONSTANTINE'S fall might safely have been predicted on the day when the United States entered the war. His pro-Germanism may have been exaggerated, but there can be no question that he has consistently held to a belief in ultimate German success in the Balkans at least, and has employed every means, constitutional or otherwise, to keep his country in the good graces of the Germans. The effect of his policy has been disastrous to the Entente. But for Constantine Greece might have entered the war in time to restrain Bulgaria from joining the Teutonic alliance. The desirability of putting an end to so hostile an influence has long been recognized by Allied statesmen. But since the king was backed up by a very large section of the Greek population, who desired to keep out of the war at all costs, drastic action against him could not well be taken so long as there was an important body of neutral opinion to be conciliated. With the United States in the war neutral opinion has practically disappeared. Constantine now can command sympathy only in Berlin.

A POLITICAL purpose can scarcely be argued as well as asserted in a single phrase, but the crises in Canada and Ireland throw a cold light on so rosy a formula as "the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated development of all peoples." Ulster and French-Canada may not be "peoples" within the meaning of this Wilsonian phrase, but they are sufficiently distinct from the groups with which they are associated to create a nationalistic problem, all the more typical because in one case the imperial interest demands solicitude for a minority and in the other requires conformity. It is the composition of the Irish convention which in one case provides a national issue, the concern of the predominant power in this case being to protect its imperial stake by insisting on the nomination of an undue number of peers and bishops and Unionists. In Canada the situation is reversed. There the thing that is feared is precisely the "undictated" attitude of French Canada. For that reason compliance with conscription by the church leaders and Sir Wilfred Laurier is anxiously desired.

IT is quite clear that an Englishman who believes in consulting the wishes of Ulster, in one case, can scarcely argue against consulting the wishes of French-Canada, in the other. And in as much as the exclusiveness of French-Canada in regard to conscription is something that few Englishmen care to contemplate, the exclusiveness of Ulster in regard to home rule seems to be similarly placed. The eloquence of both situations, however, is mainly in showing the difficulty that inheres in emphasizing and seeking to guarantee exclusiveness. Where a whole people is solidly opposed to a vicious government, there is no ground for dispute. No one has a word to say in favor of the "undictated development" of the Turk. But where the emphasis is changed, where the minority that stands out pays little heed to the group as a whole and is always ready to dispute the terms of sovereignty, it is manifestly impossible to guarantee extreme state-rights and exclusiveness. When an American thinks of a nationalistic group that has the same attitude toward sovereignty as the Mormons, the necessity for circumscribing such a group and even the legitimacy of dictation becomes tolerably clear.

THE appointment of Count Esterhazy as Premier of Austria-Hungary and the succinct comment of the reactionary Count Tisza upon it—"It is the beginning of a revolution"—is but a further bit of evidence that Vienna intends to force Germany to offer liberal terms to the Allies so that peace negotiations may be begun this fall. The young Emperor has evidently attempted less to crush the discontent in Bohemia, for example, than to allay it by political concessions. But those concessions imply much more than a granting of local autonomy; they must also be distinct steps towards peace if the war-weariness of the people in the Dual Monarchy is not soon to reach the point of human endurance. Two impelling motives have bound Vienna to Berlin—fear of Russia and gratitude for the services rendered in this war. The fear of Russia vanished with the revolution. Gratitude towards Germany still endures, yet not so tenaciously that Austria-Hungary is willing to fight on for an indefinite period just for German aggrandizement. Esterhazy is the friend of Apponyi, an out-and-out pacifist, and Andrassy, who has publicly stated that England was not responsible for this war. What the Pan-Germanists to-day are most afraid of is not the weakness of Hollweg, but the strength of the opposition in Vienna.

ONE result of the submarine campaign that the Germans probably overlooked is the rapid progress of the United States toward second place as an ocean carrier. We are building ships as a war measure, but we shall not cease building ships when peace returns. Our steel ship building capacity at the end of eighteen months will exceed 2,000,000 tons a year, a figure that compares well

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the best years of British shipbuilding before the war. So great an output of tonnage involves, to be sure, a degree of pressure upon our shipbuilding plant that entails heavy unit costs. But for several years after the war freights are likely to be high enough to justify expensive construction. In the end we shall learn how to build as cheaply as any other nation. It is reasonably certain that we shall not only build ships, but navigate them as well. When the German merchant marine at last issues from its harbors, it will encounter the competition of an American merchant marine, great and rapidly growing, and vigorously supported by the government that has called it into being.

THE new American tonnage may for a time find adequate employment in the North Atlantic. Sooner or later, however, it will distribute itself over the main trading routes of the world. Some of it will find its way into the Pacific, to break the monopoly that Japanese shipping has recently enjoyed. The Japanese are quite awake to this danger to their commercial interest. They would like to operate their own shipyards to their full capacity of 400,000 or 500,000 tons a year, in order to fill any void in Pacific shipping, but they lack material. Hence the suggestion of the Japanese Minister of Communications that the United States supply materials so that Japan might coöperate with the Entente in making good the submarine losses. If we can produce shipbuilding materials beyond the requirements of our own shipyards, there may be good reason for supplying Japan, provided that Japan will in return pool issues with us and our Allies in the disposition of her existing tonnage. We certainly ought not to place an added strain upon our steel industry to provide Japan with shipbuilding materials without a substantial quid pro quo in the form of immediate service to the Allied cause.

COMPLETE reports of the registration under the Selective Service act are not yet available. Returns from thirty-nine states put the registration at a little less than 93 per cent of the census estimates, with the exemptions claimed amounting to about 60 per cent of the total. These figures do not include the men who have registered since June 5th. The difference between registration and census estimate, taking in every case the latest returns that have been published, varies surprisingly from state to state. It is greatest in Washington, where registration is only 50.9 per cent of the estimate. In Michigan registration is 113.6 per cent of the estimate. Ohio stands second, with more than 110 per cent. Wisconsin, with 104.6 per cent, is well up on the list. The most puzzling discrepancies occur in the Pacific Coast states, where we find Washington's 50.9 per cent and Oregon's 57.9 contrasting with California's 81.8. Why was the registration so much heavier in California than in either of her northern neighbors? Washington despatches say the census estimates were too high. Very likely they were, but why was the error so much greater in Oregon and Washington than in California?

CERTAIN members of the United States Senate continue to behave even in time of war as if they were partisans first, last and always. They continue to insist upon treating all appointments to the federal service as the reward for party service. The press reports for instance that Senator Overman has requested the President to withdraw the name of Mr. Lester H. Woolsey, nominated as Solicitor of the State Department. The Senator's request is primarily based on the suspicion that Mr. Woolsey is a Republican in politics. Incidentally it is suggested that he has not the necessary legal qualifications. The President, it is reported, has notified the Senator that he will not withdraw Mr. Woolsey's name. This is as it should be. Mr. Woolsey has served the State Department long and faithfully. He is familiar with the complicated negotiations of the past three years. The country needs men of his qualifications in the Department of State and in the diplomatic service. For Senators to block the appointment of such men on political grounds is as inexcusable as it would be to demand that the army and navy go without ammunition, unless such supplies be purchased from persons regularly enrolled in the Democratic party.

THE appeal now being made by the Red Cross for a large fund to carry on a great variety of charitable and other work during the war is an example of American philanthropy at its best. It is proposed practically to concentrate the major part of the private relief and medical service rendered by Americans either to their fellow-countrymen or to their Allies in one comprehensive organization. This organization would be able to exercise the maximum pressure on the rich to give liberally, and it would guarantee by virtue of the employment of the most expert assistance to spend the money with the best possible results. It is a big conception, worthy of the fine traditions of American philanthropy, which has always excelled that of other countries both in its resources and in its tendency to coöperative organization. The government will undoubtedly take in taxation a substantial part of the fund which has hitherto

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been drawn on for philanthropic purposes, and it is doubtful how far this diminution of the fund will dry up the sources of private charity. If the appeal now being made by the Red Cross should partially fail, it would mean a further assumption of relief work by the national government and presumably of additional taxation to pay for it.

What the Russian Government Wants

PRESIDENT WILSON'S recent note to Russia, published finally after an unexplained but not inexplicable delay, is a crisp and uncompromising fighting document. It is an unusually eloquent and succinct statement of some of the better purposes of the allied enemies of Germany. If the Russian Revolution had not taken place, and if Petrograd were not divided from London and Paris on the interpretation and application of the declared principles, the note would leave very little to be desired. But unfortunately the state of public opinion in Russia is unstable and sensitive. The Russian Revolutionists when they took possession of the Foreign Office discovered the existence of certain agreements among the Allies which, if carried out, might make the war look like one of conquest. They have asked, consequently, not for a reaffirmation of general principles whose disinterested application to particular situations might be extremely doubtful, but for assurances against the commission of specific acts. President Wilson's note not only fails to supply these assurances or to sympathize with the demand for them, but it ignores the reasons and the motives of the Russian government in wanting them. It is adapted, consequently, to only one aspect of the existing diplomatic situation. At a time when the diplomacy of war cannot be separated from the diplomacy of peace, he has issued a document which belongs chiefly to the diplomacy of war and which will alienate rather than conciliate the Russian allies to whom it is addressed. Any effect it may have in uniting Washington with Rome, Paris and London will be more than counterbalanced by its effect in uniting Berlin with Vienna and Sofia and in dividing Washington from Petrograd.

The substance of Mr. Wilson's declaration of principles as distinguished from his method of recommending them to the present Russian government is unexceptionable. His note was framed chiefly to expose the defects of a peace program based on the formula of no annexation and no indemnities; and it supplies a convincing statement of the merely negative and sterile nature of such a formula. A settlement based exclusively on the status quo ante would constitute a confession of bankruptcy on the part of European statesmanship and would postpone rather than courageously face the problems of an ultimately satisfactory peace. The President fails, it is true, to see that a program of no annexation and no indemnities is not equivalent to the status quo ante, and that in proposing it the Russian democrats plainly consider the Russian Revolution and American participation in the war to have altered beyond recognition the older order of Europe; but this is a minor defect. He is justified in demanding a settlement which will diminish the provocation to war and which will tend to convert the treaty of peace into an honest experiment in organized international security and justice.

To that end he very properly places the utmost emphasis upon a league of nations—upon the "common covenant"; "the genuine and practical coöperation which will in effect combine the forces of the free peoples of the world" "to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations one with another." It is, as he finely says, the world's best chance of imparting to the brotherhood of man "the structure of force and reality." Unless such a "workable partnership" among nations can be organized and operated the territorial readjustments proposed by the Allies, no matter how justified in themselves, will not make for peace, because they will do nothing to undermine the existing theory and practice of wholly independent and irresponsible sovereign states. For a similar reason the fatal defect of the peace program of the Russian socialists has consisted less in its opposition to annexation and indemnities than its comparative indifference to a league of nations.

Mr. Wilson was also right in insisting upon the necessity of union among the Allies in a fighting policy as a condition of bringing the peace league into existence. Until the ruling class in Germany either ceases to rule or shows clear indications of a chastened spirit, any relaxation of the economic and military pressure on Germany would be disastrous. The German people must be taught to understand with what abhorrence the rest of the world regards the political creed and practice of their ruling class and how recklessly it will "pour out blood and treasure" in order to prevent the triumph of such ruthless and fanatical national ambitions. The soil favorable to the growth of a future league of nations is being fertilized by the blood which is being shed in order to resist German aggression. The league is becoming a living body in so far as the Allies are prepared to fight on in loyal coöperation until Germany yields the essential controversy, and one indispensable condition of loyal coöperation is the joint endeavor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to reach a more nearly complete mutual understanding and a fuller agreement upon underlying political principles.

It is unfortunate, consequently, that Mr. Wilson himself has not tried to reach a better understanding with the Russian social democrats. His note betrayed a curious lack of imagination about the complexities, the infirmities and the dominant motives of the ruling opinion in Petrograd. It contained none of the assurances and protestations necessary to increase the loyalty of a government controlled by the Council of Workmen and Soldiers. He accuses the Russian socialists of allowing themselves to be used for their own undoing by the Imperial German government, while at the same time he never expresses by a single word his appreciation of the invaluable contribution which the Russian democrats have made to the future pacification of Central Europe by virtue of their own renunciation of a policy of conquest and of power. If the President had exhibited some sympathy with the Russian point of view and credited the Russian democrats with an honest desire for a permanent settlement and with the intention and intelligence to avoid becoming merely the victims of German intrigue, he would have placed the rest of his note in a much more persuasive and attractive perspective. He could then have insisted as much as he pleased and with the maximum effect upon the necessity of continuing to fight in loyal coöperation until Germany yields as one absolutely indispensable condition of organized peace.

In these respects the English note which answered the request of the Russian government for a statement of the British war aims was better framed than that of Mr. Wilson. While also seeking refuge in the reaffirmation of principles whose meaning and effect depended on their concrete application, the British government did not lecture the erring Russians and showed some measure of appreciation for what they had done in imposing on themselves the kind of renunciation which they were asking of others. But what is of most importance is the definite statement made by the British government of its willingness to discuss with its Allies a revision of the agreements to which the Russians have been objecting. Thus Great Britain and presumably France show at least a preliminary indication of yielding to Russia the essential demands of the Russian socialists. They are willing to modify the agreements which, as the Russians think, would have written conquest into the treaty of peace. This is the critical and decisive concession. If the Italian government will join in making it, the way will be paved for military coöperation among the Allies based on a thorough agreement both upon principles and upon their application. Under the cover of Mr. Wilson's eloquence, the western Allies have skilfully begun a strategic retreat which we hope will carry them to a diplomatic line which will be far less assailable than the military line of General von Hindenburg.

The Industrial Truce

IN spite of the patriotic efforts of Mr. Gompers and the American Federation of Labor to establish an industrial truce, strikes have by no means ended. From the Bliss torpedo factory in Brooklyn to the shipbuilding yards of California, from the woolen mills of Lawrence to the munition plants in Rock Island and Memphis, there has been a steady succession of more or less serious interruptions of output. Owing to the persistent disregard of labor news by the orthodox dailies, it is rarely possible to learn the immediate cause of these industrial disturbances. The reports in the labor press are rarely complete or impartial. Yet one general explanation of the reviving labor unrest stands out with sufficient clearness—the absence of national standards of work and pay.

From the reports of their proceedings, it appears that Mr. Gompers and his volunteer aids on the Labor Committee of the Advisory Commission on National Defense are placing undue reliance upon voluntary conciliation and arbitration as sufficient guaranties of industrial peace. They have created a sub-committee on Mediation and Conciliation, headed by the President of the National Civic Federation, with local sub-sub-committees in twenty-two industrial centers to coöperate with the commissioners of conciliation of the United States Department of Labor in the adjustment of industrial disputes. According to the Secretary of the American Federation of Labor, they contemplate the organization of a national board of arbitration to which, in default of settlement by the local committees, disputes may be taken on appeal. But the determinations of this board would have no binding effect, for organized labor is definitely opposed to compulsory arbitration in plants operated for private profit. Their force would be that of publicity only. In the event that both conciliation and advisory arbitration failed to secure continuity of production, it would rest with the government to commandeer the distraught factories and impose terms of its own by virtue of the military power vested in the President by Congress.

No doubt there will be many cases in which the expert mediators of the Department of Labor, supported by the good offices of Mr. Gompers and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his patriotic volunteers, will restore peace; others will yield to the mere threat of drastic governmental intervention. But in industrial relations, as in matters of personal health, prevention is infinitely more efficacious than cure. The obvious defect of Mr. Gompers's plan, as of practically all existing schemes of arbitration, is that it becomes operative only after the outbreak of trouble. To remedy this defect, the executive council of the Metal Trades Department of the American Federation of Labor, representing fifteen powerful unions, recently adopted resolutions calling upon the "regularly authorized authorities of the government to provide a clause in all contracts let by the government guaranteeing a just standard of working and living conditions and to let no contract to any firm or corporation whose plants do not operate under such conditions." These metal-workers evidently recognize the truth that no scheme of mediation or arbitration can be thoroughly effective unless it rests upon an impersonal basis of standards—standards that must be scientifically defined and recognized by both parties in advance of employment. Whenever boards of arbitration are compelled to improvise standards to appraise the merits of *ex-parte* arguments made in the heat of disputes, they invariably cast a cloud upon the justice of their findings, especially in the minds of the defeated party. Attempts to enforce improvised findings, whether by voluntary boards through an appeal to public opinion or by authorized agents of government, inevitably breed the spirit of revolt. England's experience, notably in the Welsh coal fields—and there is abundance American evidence to the same effect—shows that threats of fine and imprisonment will not restrain organized bodies of disaffected men. Not even the government can get maximum production by locking men up in jail.

By a just standard of working and living conditions, the metal trades executives obviously mean the standard which they have been able to enforce in shops which they control. But even the metal trades are far from completely organized. The entire membership of the American Federation of Labor to-day is much less than half the number of wage-workers in manufacturing establishments reported by the federal census of 1909. In order to meet the pressing needs of the army and navy, the government will have to place the majority of its contracts in establishments where the unions have little or nothing to say, and it is unreasonable to expect owners of non-union factories to accept trade-union standards of the final measure of impartial justice. Before the government can safely or fairly include standards of working and living conditions in its contracts, it will have to find some agency of unquestioned scientific authority to define precisely what just standards are.

Fortunately, the American government has such an agency ready at hand in the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor. For more than thirty years this bureau has been in the business of accumulating industrial facts. It keeps in living contact with the centers of industrial information not only in the forty-eight states but also in every industrial nation on the globe. It sedulously follows all experiments in management and labor organization in private and public plants. It has had unique experience in dealing with industrial disputes. There are probably in all the world no better sources of information on the evolution of industrial standards than its Monthly Review and the published reports of its special investigations. It has on its staff experts who are thoroughly competent to define these standards and to supervise their impartial and wise application.

But like so many of the most valuable scientific agencies of the government, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has been hampered year in and year out by the parsimony of Congress. Anticipating the difficult industrial problems that would face the government in case of war, it planned its budget for 1917-18 with special reference to their solution. It applied to Congress for additional clerks so that it might analyze its fund of information and draft a standard labor code for the guidance of the federal and state governments. This request was denied. Trade agreements are of the essence of industrial peace. Hundreds of American factories operate under collective agreements. To know what agreements have worked well and why others have failed is a condition of successful mediation. No comprehensive or measurably adequate study of the subject has ever been made. The Bureau asked for $19,000 for such a study. The request was denied. Many of the most difficult industrial problems arise from the increasing employment of women. These problems are seriously aggravated by the emergencies of war. The Bureau asked for $25,000 to enable it to coöperate effectively in dealing with the adjustments which the abnormal employment of women demands. This request was denied.

Most industrial disputes grow out of the accumulation of petty irritations due to inefficient management, the maladjustment of men to jobs and jobs to men, the unconscious strain of bad lighting or ventilation, the arrangement of hours in defiance of elementary physiological laws—ignorance or neglect of the thousand little things that make or break harmonious relationships. The economic importance of these human considera-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions is beginning to receive wide recognition among employers of the highest type. But many employers are the victims of tradition, many have insufficient resources to employ experts in the diagnosis of the human problems of industry. Like our farmers, such employers would welcome assistance of the kind which the demonstration agents of the Department of Agriculture have given and are giving to the guardians of our bread. To make industrial surveys and to carry to all employers the best experience of the most highly organized plants, the Bureau asked for an appropriation of $21,600. This request was denied. Every attempt of the Bureau to prepare for the industrial emergencies which the experiences of Europe had prophesied was hampered by the refusal of Congress to grant appropriations which would have been insignificant compared with the sums annually dispensed for superfluous postoffice buildings in obscure hamlets. And yet it is only through such work as the Bureau sought permission to do that it will ever become possible to define just standards of working and living conditions.

And now comes the news that in addition to the paralysis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the indifference of Congress has forced the Department of Labor to cut down its staff of mediators for lack of funds. How serious the effect of this short-sighted policy threatens to become is indicated by the records of the Department. In 1915 the federal mediators settled 41 labor disputes; they settled 227 in 1916; and so far this year they have already adjusted 267 strikes or threatened strikes. Within the past month alone they were called in to mediate 66 controversies, many of them in plants vital to the conduct of the war. Contrary to the impression conveyed by the silence of the orthodox press, there was never a time when the labor situatiton was more tense than it is at this moment.

While Mr. Gompers and the Labor Committee of the Advisory Commission on National Defense have been issuing patriotic resolutions, holding love-feasts of employers and labor leaders in Washington, and organizing amateur committees on mediation and conciliation, they have permitted Congress to ignore the Department which, in response to the importunity of organized labor, Congress itself created only "to foster, promote and develop the welfare of the wage-earners of the United States, to improve their working conditions and to advance their opportunities for profitable employment." By its judicious administration of its powers, the Department of Labor has won a position of great prestige both among wage-workers and employers. No voluntary organization, however patriotically inspired, can hope to fill its place in this time of national peril. If the industrial truce which Mr. Gompers has done so much to establish is not to yield, as it did in England, to ruinous labor unrest and a federal scheme of compulsory arbitration, it will have to be buttressed by the full strength of the Department of Labor. In any event, the need for the expert services of the Bureau of Mediation, and especially of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, will become increasingly acute as the war makes its economic pressure increasingly felt. Mr. Gompers and the Labor Committee of the Advisory Commission on National Defense could give no more valuable or convincing demonstration of their patriotic interest in maintaining the industrial truce than by urging Congress to reconsider its action on the Department of Labor's carefully considered requests.

Understanding Russia

THE American Commission has reached Petrograd and for the next months will count at least in the public mind as an important modifying influence on the obscure and precarious situation in Russia. All Americans are united in hoping that it will bring to the young republic the needed assistance. If this assistance consisted only of money, materials and engineering skill, and if, consequently, the chief task of the American Commission to Russia, like that of the British and French commissions to America, was that of planning a broad basis of practical coöperation, its success would be assured. Whatever the American nation can do to resurrect Russian credit, and to give to Russia the benefit of American industrial resources and technical skill, it is both willing and anxious to do. But unfortunately the problem is only in part one of helping the Russian government to invigorate the Russian military and industrial organization. It is far more a matter of conducting a novel and difficult negotiation which will seek to remove dissension within Russia, and between Russia and her allies, as to the principles of a just and lasting settlement, and which consequently would pull Russia together and make her power more effective both in defeating her enemies and in aiding her allies. A revolutionary government which possibly may not be authoritative enough to fight at all must be helped to obtain the materials to fight with, while at the same time a policy must be defined which the Russian democracy in combination with its allies is willing to fight for.

Too much, however, must not be expected of the American Commission. It will be negotiating not with a self-possessed government but with a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government which depends on shifting and uncontrolled winds of popular opinion. It will be dealing with forces which may be guided, if they are understood, but which cannot be merely manipulated or coerced. It is improbable that any commission of foreigners even though composed of super-statesmen could render to the Russian democracy in its present labor anything more than a sympathetic understanding of its difficulties and aspirations and some slight alleviation of its physical distress. Russia is passing through a crisis, the outcome of which will profoundly affect the future of democracy both within Russia and outside of it; but it is a crisis whose results must be largely determined by the past political history and the latent political aptitudes of the Russian nation. If the Russian revolutionary democrats finally adopt the policy which is most likely to make for the future safety of democracy in Russia and elsewhere, they will do so not because of foreign advice or pressure but chiefly because of their recognition of the inexorable conditions upon which the triumph of their policy depends, and upon their ability to act on their own knowledge.

As long as the period of physical distress and moral uncertainty lasts, foreigners and particularly Americans should beware of alienating the Russian democracy by impatient, unfriendly and superficial criticism. The ultimate effect and significance of the Russian Revolution cannot be judged by its unfortunate immediate tendency to embarrass the military operations of the enemies of Germany. Before its effects are spent it will compete with such historical events as the discovery of America, the Reformation and the French Revolution for the distinction of being one of the great determining influences in the progress of the modern world. It possesses all the authority and majesty of a stupendous popular movement, for which elaborate but obscure preparation has been made in the past life of the Russian people and which is bound in part to work itself out in incalculable ways according to its own inner needs. The Russian Revolution was wholly different from a neat and self-sufficient coup d'état. It did not happen how and when it happened because of the enterprise and contrivance of a few shrewd and bold men. A nation involved in a desperate and exhausting war is not moved to abolish a system of government which it has accepted for centuries by the propitiousness of the occasion or with any conscious expectation of a quick recovery of its national self-possession. The Romanoff dynasty and its ignoble bureaucracy were overthrown at this particular time, because even in the midst of a desperate war it had become an intolerable indignity to submit any longer to such a combination of inefficiency, corruption and tyranny. Yet once the revolution exploded as the long-repressed expression of a salutary fermentation in the soul of the Russian people, it was certain to release insurgent and undeveloped social and economic forces. These forces cannot be suppressed even at the dictation of military necessity without doing violence to the deepest instinctive aspirations of the Russian people.

If as a consequence of the revolution the Russian army remains no more than half-efficient, the Allied nations should regard this result if not with satisfaction at least with toleration. In the long run the cause of the Allied countries has much more to gain from Russia, incompetent and even distracted but free, than from a Russia powerful but still enslaved. The substitution for the Romanoff dynasty of a patriotic dictatorship, headed by a Grand Duke, might have temporarily sustained the fighting morale of the Russian nation, but it would have dissociated the revolution from the inoffensive and pacific strain in the Russian character. It must never be forgotten how priceless are the gifts which the Russian democracy has brought to the cause of organized peace, and how tarnished these gifts would be in case the Romanoff dynasty was or still is succeeded by a military dictatorship. The present Provisional Government, precarious as its authority is, is doing something more effective to undermine militarism than could a dictator who would be compelled to adopt a policy of violent internal repression in order to support one of external aggression. It is trying to bring about the permanent renunciation by the Russian nation of an aggressive foreign policy. It is proving the sincerity of its internationalist aspirations by pacifying its own policy before attempting to force pacification on other nations. In so far as it succeeds, its achievement will constitute the greatest single stride towards the organization of peace which has yet been taken in the history of mankind. It makes possible the incorporation in a peace league of those peoples of Central Europe whose geographical situation and economic needs have given them most excuse to convert the necessity of national defense into an engine of aggressive militarism. It deprives the Prussian Junker of his excuse for regimenting Germany and enclosing Central Europe with economic and political fortifications. It will prove to be ultimately a more insidious and powerful enemy to Pan-Germanism than the British navy and the French army. Even though Russian troops will be of less assistance to the Allies than formerly, Russian ideas will fight still more valiantly and successfully on their behalf.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But Russia's contribution to the common cause must consist of more than ideas, more even than an ordinance denying to herself the privilege of aggression. The Russian democracy as a growing body cannot escape from the condition of its birth. It emerged as a power in the world during a war which its success in overthrowing its own autocracy helped decisively to convert into a war to safeguard democracy. Under such circumstances, its ability to negotiate for the peace of justice will be measured by its ability to fight against an unjust peace. As long as Germany remains in armed occupation of Russian, Polish, Serbian, French and Belgian territory, as long as it is the frank intention of Germany as a consequence of victory to wring from her enemies every possible economic and territorial concession, negotiations are no substitute for fighting. The ruling class in Germany is not only impervious but utterly inimical to democratic ideas. It is refusing at present to order a military attack upon Russia, even though Russia is temporarily weakened, because it expects to see this Russian revolutionary democracy go to pieces. It is counting on Russian national disintegration under the influence of revolutionary ideas, and it fears that an attack would stimulate the Russian government to consolidate the nation in resistance to a renewed invasion. It should be a point of honor with the Russian democracy to prove the falsity of these amiable anticipations. If Russia goes to pieces, or consents to separation from its Allies, it will become both the accomplice and victim of Germany.

The one way for the Russian democracy to insure its own downfall and compromise the security of liberalism throughout the world is the forfeiture of its own ability and the undermining of its own readiness to fight. The desirable peace cannot be conquered merely by fighting, but neither can it be reached without fighting. The precious offering which the new Russia has contributed to the ultimate pacification of the world will perish unless for the time being it is vigorously defended by the sword. Russia is indispensable to the anti-German alliance. Her desertion would constitute a prodigious and irremediable disaster. Her continued weakness would be enormously costly. In so far as she quits, she is in danger of confirming the domination of autocratic militarism in Germany, of encouraging its growth in France and Great Britain, and America, and ensuring its ultimate victory in Russia itself. Only by being resolved and prepared to fight as well as to negotiate until Germany offers acceptable terms, can the Russian democrats make their pacifist aspirations prevail both against their enemies and with their allies.

Trade War or Stable Peace

IF the cessation of armed hostilities in Europe is succeeded by a trade war, history will merely have repeated itself. Every great war of recent times has led to commercial reprisals. It is not merely that the nationalistic passions aroused by war remain unextinguished in the following period of peace. Such wars as the Crimean, the Franco-Prussian, the Russo-Japanese have been regarded as the precursors of war to come, and for this very reason have made for commercial restrictions. To place barriers in the way of the commercial development of states that are regarded as future enemies is sound statecraft, if not sound economics. Whether the present war is to inaugurate a period of liberalism or of desperate conflict in the commercial field must depend upon the outcome of the war and the kind of peace that shall be established.

A certain recrudescence of protectionism appears in any case to be inevitable. There is probably not a country in the world in which the failure of supplies from the countries at war has not created new industries that will have to fight for life when peace again awakens foreign competition. Their claim to protection will be regarded as indefeasible by most legislative bodies. America will be among the first countries to grant protection in such cases, and thus will be estopped from raising objections to protective duties imposed by foreign countries to a like end, even though such duties affect American trade adversely.

Protectionism of this kind need not, however, be taken too seriously. It must be limited in range and can only gradually effect the exclusion of foreign products. What we have reason to be concerned about it is the kind of commercial policies that must supervene if the war ends in a peace that bears the character of a truce, not a final disposition of the war problem.

That industrial power and economic self-sufficiency are of paramount importance in war is a lesson we may assume that every statesman in the world has taken to heart. Germany's armies, though the best trained and equipped in the world, would have availed her little if her industry and agriculture had not proved equal to the demands placed upon them. If then we are to live under the shadow of another world war, we must expect not only Germany, but every other Power, to work resolutely to establish the economic conditions upon which effective military performance must be based. Considerations of cheapness and abundance of products, of efficiency of labor and capital will not weigh against such vital values as national power in war. Industries that operate under unfavor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

able conditions as compared with their foreign competitors will be maintained somehow, just as armaments will be kept in an efficient state, regardless of cost. How this concerns America as an exporting state is obvious. American food will be dispensed with wherever possible. And industrial exports from America, especially metallurgical products and machinery, will have to meet the competition of foreign products enjoying every favor that governments striving for industrial power can grant.

Economic self-sufficiency in war is attainable only to great areas transcending, in Europe at least, the limits of any single nationality. Germany could not now be self-sufficing without commanding the resources of Austria-Hungary and the Balkan states; France must draw heavily upon non-French agriculture and industry; Italy must look beyond the boundaries fixed by even the most extended conception of Italian nationality for the material and fuel she needs for war or peace. Accordingly economic and political organization after the war can not follow the lines of nationality, unless peace is established on a permanent basis. The several great Powers will be under the necessity of drawing to themselves, by a network of preferential commercial relations, such territories as may be required to realize their economic self-sufficiency. They will also be under the necessity of discouraging trade with territories whose economic power might fall to the benefit of their enemies in a future war. Germany will have to attract Austria-Hungary and the Balkan states into her economic circle, no matter how serious the difficulty of reconciling her own agricultural and mining interests to such competition may be. France will have to develop Algeria more intensively and transform her protectorate of Morocco into annexation. Italy will have to fix her ambitions upon the eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand Germany will have to strive for independence from American agriculture and industry. The British Empire will have good reason for placing obstacles in the way of Swedish industry and trade, since by virtue of geography Swedish economic resources are most likely to serve German purposes in time of war.

Self-sufficiency even for great economic units can extend only to minimum necessities. Every great Power will strive to secure favorable trading relations with territories that must prove inaccessible in time of war, as the Latin-American states are now inaccessible to Germany. Such trade, even if only temporary, helps to build up the national wealth. And what one Power thus secures is withheld from other Powers. We must not forget that if the war system is to continue, each great Power must look upon its neighbor's prosperity as its own loss. Hence, assuming a peace that is only a truce, we may anticipate the most unremitting efforts on the part of every Power to command the greatest possible colonial domain and to exploit it to the exclusion of the other Powers. We may also anticipate the employment of consummate skill by each Power to effect exclusive commercial arrangements with the non-industrial states. And at such a game the United States is most likely to be a loser. As compared with the Europeans we are tyros in commercial negotiations.

But if the war ends with a stable peace, assured by a permanent organization controlling an unquestionable preponderance of the military and economic power of the world, all strivings toward economic self-sufficiency will be stripped of sound reason. No valid argument can be applied to the German Junker, to make him sink his ancient hostility to the Hungarian pig and grain sack. The greater economic units, transcending lines of nationality, will lack all principle of cohesion when their disadvantages in peace can not be offset by their advantages in war. There will be no reason for discouraging commercial relations with any country that offers products useful in time of peace. There will be no ground for regarding another country's gain as tantamount to one's own country's loss. The heightened national consciousness that attends war will doubtless for a time express itself in a popular preference for the home trader as against foreign competition. It may be expected to express itself, also as has already been indicated, in a recrudescence of protectionism. But these are after all transitory influences. Granted a peace that ends war, the coming era promises to be one of commercial liberalism.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1917, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
GEORGE SOULE, Assistant Editor
CHARLES MERZ, Washington Representative

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Fatal Confusion

> "You say it is the good cause which hallows even war? I tell you it is the good war which hallows every cause."—Nietzsche.

IF, as a problem in morals, you were asked this question: "Is it right to cut up a living man with a sharp knife?" you would certainly reply that it depended entirely whether the cutting up were that of the surgeon, the assassin or the executioner. And if the questioner should retort: "You are evading the question with fine-spun distinguos. Keep to the hard facts of knife and body, blood and iron. These are the realities. Do you sanction the act?"—why, then of course you would abandon the conversation, for you would know that you were dealing with a child, or a savage or a lunatic, dissociating, like an animal, the present physical act from the ultimate purpose which in morals justified or condemned it.

Yet an exactly similar confusion underlies most popular discussion of the problems of war and peace. It has vitiated and distorted the propaganda of pacifist and militarist alike; is one of the main facts which have made armaments in the past utterly ineffective to the maintenance of peace or justice, and promises to make victory ineffective to achieve the ends for which the war was undertaken.

At different periods during the last twenty years in America or France or England the problem of national security has come up for discussion. Always, for the public, it became condensed into one question: Did you or did you not favor an enlargement of the military or naval instrument. The purpose for which the instrument was to be used practically never came into the discussion. If the American, discerning in the vague background some challenge to England over Venezuela or the Panama Canal, or to Spanish America over Mexican misrule, or to Asia over Japanese differences; or if the Englishman, foreseeing the possibility of collision with France over Newfoundland lobsters or a Fashoda outpost, replied to the question, "It depends what policy it is intended to enforce with the increase whether I am in favor of it or not," inevitably he was regarded as dodging the issue with logic-chopping. Yet obviously if British power was to have any restraining effect upon, say, the German, it was necessary that the German should know that that power was to be used to prevent his doing certain things. And it was because he did not know that with any certainty, because in other words the instrument was dissociated from its purpose, that it failed to have restraining effect. Had British power, actual and potential, stood unmistakably for, say, the integrity of existing European states and against, say, the nationally monopolistic exploitation of extra-European ones, this war would never have taken place.

As with the machinery of war, so with war itself. For two years Mr. Roosevelt has favored "war"; Mr. Bryan has favored "peace." It is not very evident that Mr. Roosevelt cared particularly what the war would accomplish, what policy it was destined to promote. What he wanted was the fact of war. With the rest he was unconcerned. Whether, as the result of the war the solution of the sea problem would be found in the limitation of belligerent rights under the old form of national control or the enlargement of them under international control; whether Allied victory would mean the creation of a community of limited independencies or the old rivalries of unlimited ones, a concert or a balance of power, inclusion or exclusion of the Central Powers from future international association, all this, so far as one can gather, was, in Mr. Roosevelt's view, irrelevant. It did not matter much what war accomplished as long as you went to war. Whether the knife was applied to the body for the purposes of surgery or assassination was not the main question. The main thing was to stick it in and hang the consequences.

And Mr. Bryan seemed as little concerned with the ultimate results, or indeed the real meaning of "peace" for America. The country, from the beginning of the war, had been making enormous contributions to its prosecution—much larger than those made by certain of the formal belligerents like Japan. For America to furnish ammunition, guns and material to the French or British armies for payment was peace; to do exactly the same thing without payment was war. That the maintenance of "neutrality" was equivalent to the notification to the world that in future American hands and brains were available in any war for any purpose to the belligerent who could command the sea and pay the price, did not seem greatly to disturb Mr. Bryan. For though such a position would have been monstrously immoral it would have enabled America to remain at "peace."

Neither of these famous protagonists put the emphasis of their appeal upon the final results achieved by going to war or remaining at peace; to each respectively the all important thing was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to go to war or remain at peace, without reference to what would ultimately result.

And as the war goes on more and more shall we find a man's political orthodoxy determined, not by his attitude to the objects of the war, but to the war itself. At the last you may have what view you like concerning the evils for which the war was to be a desperate remedy—you may indeed declare that the war is no remedy since those evils are inevitable—so long as you display a relish for the remedy itself.

This amazing paradox can be very easily proved. There are in England and France, as elsewhere of course, groups of writers whose reputations have been gained by their attacks upon the democratic principle in general and parliamentary government in particular; others whose political philosophy includes the doctrine that the small state is destined to disappear as part of the application of the Darwinian process to international affairs; others, exponents of nationalism *à outrance,* who have systematically disparaged as a menace to the complete freedom of the independent state any attempt to create a firm international order or even law; others, who in general have disparaged the ideal of peace as not only utopian but sordid. Yet all of these—in England at least—are passionate partisans of a war the proclaimed object of which is the defense of the democratic principle and the extension of parliamentary government, the rights of weak nations and their protection from the aggression of the strong (so setting at naught the political Darwinianism of the imperialist), the maintenance of international public right and the final ending of the struggles of rival power.

Does the fact that these teachers have for years opposed every single thing for which England is fighting render them one whit the less popular in war time, or cause any breath of suspicion concerning their political orthodoxy? Not the faintest. The fact that, for instance, The Morning Post, or Blackwoods, or half a dozen other publications of similar tone, disparage democracy, parliamentary government, liberalism and international peace and exalt imperalism and militarism detracts in no way from their popularity as correct and patriotic supporters of the nation's cause. Their chief pride indeed is the intensity of their patriotism. No one disputes the genuineness of the support that they give to a war which if successful in its aims will shatter every political principle for which they stand. On the other hand those who have been particularly marked by their earnest advocacy of the very things for which the war was undertaken are the special objects of suspicion and unpopularity.

In other words the war has become more important than its object; the means more important than the end. By some fatal confusion we have ceased to care whether the knife in the body (to return to the parable with which this article opened) does the work of the surgeon, the executioner or the assassin, so long as it goes on cutting and slashing and bloodletting. A war which begins with definite political and social purposes drifts rapidly into a mere means of securing certain primitive psychological satisfactions. We end by creating a psychosis far more concerned to feed hungry emotions than to attain cold political ends.

We don't admit this, of course, even to ourselves. Never would we avow that our real motive is the satisfaction of an appetite or passion. We find all sorts of elaborate justifications in policy. "Everything must be concentrated on the one problem of winning the war." Yet that consideration did not prevent the most widespread support being given to projects like the Paris Conference for arranging the economic "war after the war," which was not only not concerned with the waging of the war but was certain to make its waging the more difficult by stiffening the enemy's resistance to a defeat which the Conference duly announced to him would mean his commercial extinction! Yet because this encouragement to the enemy, and distraction of public attention from the war to after the war problems, also satisfied a hungry emotion—of pugnacity, anger, hate—it was immensely popular.

A little less transparent perhaps is the argument that since complete defeat of the enemy is the one thing which will discredit his militarism and demonstrate that aggression does not pay, victory is synonymous with settlement, is at once the means and the end is not only necessary, which the present writer is not concerned to deny, but is also enough, of itself all-sufficient, which it is his present object to disprove.

The notion that a "good hiding" will deflect a whole race of people from a purpose which, unless conditions are modified, may have behind it the push of real or imaginary need, or even long maintained tradition, is widely accepted, not only by the militarist in the street, but in the study as well. Mr. Hilaire Belloc has laid down an historical dogma to the effect that a cause once having been thoroughly defeated in war may be regarded as settled and done with. An American recently urged something similar in the proposition that the best means of preventing in future wars the misuse of mine and submarine at sea, was effectively to "punish" the Germans for such misuse in this war.

It would be truer to say that military defeat

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

never disposed of a cause. It was not military defeat which disposed of the Boer Republics in South Africa, for Ireland has been defeated militarily much more completely, and her question is still open. If one problem is settled and the other unsolved, it is not because military victory has been less complete in the one case, but because British statesmanship has used victory in one way in South Africa and in another way in Ireland.

If we allow the notion to gain ground that we need have no policy beyond beating the enemy, that victory is the end as well as the means, we shall render our victory futile, and we shall fail in the war. For the very popular notion that we shall "larn" the enemy by giving him a good licking, shall wean him from militarism by destroying his power, is bad history and worse psychology. It presupposes in the nature of man a submissive pacifism much more extreme than that which pacifists are in the habit of claiming for him.

The argument as to the efficacy of a "good licking" is used particularly by those who can find no language sufficiently ferocious to condemn what they regard as the implied readiness of the pacifist to yield to a rival rather than take the risk of fighting. Yet they assume that the enemy will so yield, will surrender his ideas of justice or ambitions provided only he is sufficiently "licked." Frighten him enough and he will accept conditions which heretofore he has not accepted and would not otherwise accept. The decisive factor in his acceptance is, in the terms of this thesis, not any change in the conditions themselves but a display of preponderant force. Overawe men sufficiently and they will give up all nonsense about defending what they regard as their rights. If this is not the militarist view how does he expect preponderant force of itself to be effective? If you simply cannot frighten men out of the defense of what they regard as their rights—which is the real foundation of the internationalist case—the only use to which you can put victory is to find out what those rights are. The internationalist assumes that until agreement on that head is reached between the two parties the aggrieved side will find somehow a means of resisting or evading the imposed settlement of the victor, of getting round or counterbalancing his force—an assumption which the history of Ireland, Poland, Alsace, the Christian population of the Balkans (whose conquerors have had "complete victory" again and again); the outcome of Europe's war a century ago during a whole generation to establish firmly the dynastic and destroy the democratic and national principle, most amply justifies.

This notion of the effectiveness of a "sound hiding" is altogether too pacifist in its fundamental assumptions; and if American public opinion is trapped by it, and fails to realize the need of a constructive policy and of associating that policy with the waging of the war, the war itself will fail. If we cannot, during the war, manage by the discussions between ourselves to give the enemy some notion of how we propose, having destroyed his militarism, to secure his national defense, and having cut off his roads to the outer world to secure his opportunity for economic development, he will to the last gasp fight as any people, good or wicked, barbarous or civilized would fight, for what they would regard as their national existence. And if by that failure to formulate policy we are compelled to wage a long and increasingly bitter war we shall come to the peace with vision blurred, understanding clouded and power of thought submerged by passion, hate, and crude herd instinct, utterly incapable of that abandonment of the old ideas and bold trial of new ones indispensable to any settlement that is to last. Our victory will in that case be what otherwise it need not be, as futile as similar victories of the past.

NORMAN ANGELL.

London.

The Trouble with Musical Comedy

I KNOW all the time how much better it would be to arrange for Holidays in the Open, to go to the Yellowstone Park and hunt for an armadillo. What purpose does musical comedy serve? None. It would be much better to study the night habits of the Australian duck-mole and write a paper about it for a learned society. But just as men betray their partners to attend a ball game, or leave home and family to go fly fishing, or spend soggy hours at the card-table or in a bowling alley or a shooting gallery, so I, fatuous slave of the asphalt, still look up and down Forty-second Street with an eye to the electric signs. In some way I find myself imagining that somewhere behind those signs there is an entertainment that will take me on its magic carpet and transport me to another world. Time and again it has failed, failed as signally as the puppy passion that devours the rug in order to get at the pattern. And yet, leaving bowling alleys and pinochle and chess and higher mathematics and the ways of the eagle to other refugees from Life, I go on picking up the evening newspaper and looking through the theatre column for my unattainable musical comedy.

Unattainable? You may think that the person

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

who uses this word is afflicted with the mania of Tantalus, is incapable of finishing any pursuit. Such people there are, impotent or supercilious, but my sense of the attainable is well within practical limits. The underlying philosophy of most bitter criticism is this: The hand that rocks the boat rules the world. It is not an inexcusable basis for criticism, considering the stupidity and folly of the particular world-administration we have inherited, but it has the disadvantage of indicting a whole class and may just as well proceed from that irascibility which made a man a critic in the first place, as from any ordered or reasonable consideration. My own complaint about musical comedy is not so sweeping. It humbly presumes to be practical.

The trouble with musical comedy is not, as persons may think who seldom go to it, with the form itself. It is with the way it has developed. For the most part it is unwittingly fashioned after Humpty Dumpty, His Decline and Fall. Humpty is the aesthetic consideration that tumbled down when the promoters began to compete with each other. After the Great Fall has been well accomplished we are invited to behold all the Broadway horses and all the Broadway men trying to raise up the semblance of an entertainment. In the course of this labor there is a sufficient display of horse-power, man-power, arm-power, leg-power. Everything that money can do, including most of the things that money does do and shouldn't, is lavished on this enterprise. But the situation, artistically speaking, is post-mortem. The more elaborate the efforts at resurrection, the more tedious.

Why? Because the splendiferous resources that the promoters command distract one so much that the result is harassed senses and irritated nerves. Somewhere there should be a psychological test of the three-ring circus and the three-layer chorus, to show the silliness of taxing attention beyond its capacity. It is the same problem in the aesthetic region as the problem of a large conference in the dialectic region or the problem of direct military commandership in the presidential region. There are limits to human elasticity. And musical comedy is not only too distended to be taken in, as it has developed, it is too elaborated to retain any centralized aesthetic impulse. Of course the persevering consumer is like a child at a picnic. He wants to discover how much he can guzzle. Having seen one set of chorus girls, he wants to see two, then four, then eight. Having had five scenes shifted for him, he wants to have ten, then twenty. The response to this greediness is only too simple, once the misguided consumer is regarded as master. It means quickening the pace, ringing the changes on lighting, dancing, singing, costume, set, mechanical contrivance and surprise. With this process under way the director tends more and more to insist on a multiplicity of sensations, leaving general aesthetic effect entirely out of the question. And so, the promoters demanding diversity for strictly competitive reasons and the directors obeying them, we have the now forlorn spectator stunned by crass sight and sound.

It is this utter distension and decentralization of the program that has made musical comedy so impossible of enjoyment—an impossibility that seems clearest of all to the ill nurtured, dispirited, mechanized chorus men and chorus girls. If a roomful of girls bending over typewriters is one of the most depressing sights in the world, a stageful of equally regimented chorus girls runs it a close second. It is not worth paying to see. The miraculous artistic spark which is just as much a presence in entertainment as living light in the eye of a human being is most of the time not to be discerned in the musical productions of Broadway. A certain galvanic activity is to be observed even in the Winter Garden chorus, and there are passages in which the usage of some of the comedians suggests the organic, but it may fairly be said that there is more happy reciprocity in the glazed eye of the average dead codfish than in the glint of the average musical comedy.

The exception comes in any show, or any part of a show, that has a centralized impulse, an artistic personality. An interloper like Chic Sale at the Winter Garden is an example. His version of a country sermon and church entertainment is an unconnected insert from vaudeville, but so witty, so observant, so original, that it lives in memory. To attain such personality is the aim that musical comedy as a whole ought to have, and where it comes near having it, as in Hitchy-Koo now at the Cohan and Harris Theatre in New York, it becomes the delectable form of art that one dreams about.

Mr. Raymond Hitchcock and Mr. E. Ray Goetz produce Hitchy-Koo, and they say that on account of the war they have avoided needless extravagance. Whatever the reason, the result is a vast improvement. In giving up the idea of prodigious ostentation a return has been made to the principle for which the theatre exists. Hitchy-Koo is described as "an intimate revue in two acts and nineteen scenes," and its excellence is implied in the word intimate. With the recurrence of Mr. Hitchcock as major-domo, the comedy seeks to be light-hearted, spontaneous, amusing, personal. It has ineptitudes. The interpolation of a pyrotechnic pianist is a mistake, and there is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a desolate stretch of sentimental song solo. But conventional as the revue is in many details, it does show enough skilful selection, creativeness, pervasive humor and finish, to revive the belief that one day there will be real musical comedy.

And there is one comedian in Hitchy-Koo to whom this country may owe much. That is Miss Frances White. She is, if you like, a gamin. She is no conventional stage lady, no American Beauty with a six-foot stem. But at this instant, in this particular revue, she swings into the happy company of Frank Tinney, Bert Williams, Harry Lauder, Chevalier. She is an artist, a comedian to her finger-tips, a singer with a vein of pathos in her simple song. She incarnates the awkward age. She drags back her glistening hair until she is a tom-boy, and much of her amusingness comes from this perky boyishness, from its brusquerie and hoarseness and camaraderie. There is no forcing of her note in the naïveté she assumes, nor in the feat movements that are comparable only with the nimble naturalness of the woods. And she has grave and measured sentiment of a lovely kind in the Tableau Chinois that she does with the accomplished William Rock.

With such comedians as Miss White, the gnome-like Florenz Ames, the amiable Errol, there is a glimpse in the current theatre of that unity in diverse humor which a musical comedy should supply. A reduced cast is only one condition of enjoyment. The free play of personality is another. And perhaps the day is coming when the subject-matter will cease to be Broadway and will become universal. Perhaps, not too far off, one may actually hear in musical comedy the silvery laughter which is the appropriate appreciation of humor, the pleasant mockery of every desire to falsify life.

FRANCIS HACKETT.

British Naval Changes

THE black fortnight of the submarine campaign in which the losses of the British mercantile marine suddenly and without explanation doubled, has stirred the government to make belated reforms in the administration of the Admiralty. Something had to be done. Already there has been a great improvement, but the new reforms and still more the spirit of them should quicken it. The main feature of the new changes is the endowment of the Admiralty with a new department which is to do for the navy what the Ministry of the Munitions did for the army, and the head of this department, Sir Eric Geddes, is not a navy man at all but a railway manager who made his mark in the Ministry of Munitions and later at the particular instance of Mr. Lloyd George took charge of the whole of the transport of the British army in France. One of the great discoveries of this war is that there is no such hard and fast distinction between military and civilian excellence as has commonly been supposed, and that the best army or for that matter the best navy is that which makes the freest use of ability from outside the profession of arms. Sir Eric Geddes in charge of transport in France solved problems that had been given up as hopeless by the military men, and solved them because he brought a completely fresh mind to his task. The trade unionist, whatever his profession, always ends by tying himself in a knot with his own rules, and not unfrequently has to be rescued by a mere amateur or layman.

When Mr. Lloyd George was forming his Cabinet he fully realized the importance of the control and economy of shipping. Sir Joseph Maclay, the head of the Ministry of Shipping then created, was neither an official nor even a Member of Parliament, but no sooner had he got to work than the extension of the submarine ravages made it necessary for the Admiralty to take entire control over shipping. The tramp steamer and the shipyard became as much a part of naval defense as the munition factory of the offensive in France. It was not enough to have a controller of shipping outside the Admiralty; the controller must be within. Sir Eric Geddes, who had left the Munitions Department to become a Major General in France as Director General of Transport, has now left the army and his Major Generalship to become a Vice Admiral, a member of the Board of Admiralty and Controller, one of the oldest titles in the navy administration, held before him by St. Vincent and Barham, First Sea Lord in the year of Trafalgar. Thus in twenty years, for he is still only forty-one, Sir Eric Geddes has found his way from Mr. Carnegie's steel works at Homestead by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railway and the Great Eastern railway in England to the Munitions Department and thence by way of the army in France to the oldest and most honorable title in Admiralty administration. It is the most extraordinary example that even this war has afforded, that war is not a close professional union but that the qualities of the organizer are everywhere the same, in business and in the army, and in the navy too. The work

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that is given Sir Eric Geddes of controlling the whole of the shipbuilding in this country was of course already being done at the Admiralty and at the Ministry of Shipping. The difference is that whereas it was formerly in several pairs of hands, it will now be in one pair and those belonging to a man who has shown that he possesses positive genius for organization.

Another change that has been made at the Admiralty is to separate administrative work from the general strategical direction of the navy. The only sign of this change that has been published is the announcement that Admiral Jellicoe is henceforth to have the title of Chief of the Naval Staff as well as First Sea Lord. It seems a small change, yet it matters. The Intelligence Department of the Navy, which has developed into the Naval War Staff, has always been under the control of the First Sea Lord, but its direction has been only one of his many duties, and in practice the First Sea Lord has had so much administrative work that he has had little time to think out the general problems of naval war. This is now to be the first duty of the First Sea Lord. What has struck everyone about the British navy in this war has been its quite remarkable combination of high efficiency with a certain dulness and lack of originality—not in the details of war, for these have commonly been extremely well managed—but in the handling of higher problems of naval strategy. There has certainly been no lack of ability at the Admiralty. Lord Fisher, who virtually made the modern British navy, is a man of great force of character and very great originality. Unfortunately he belonged to what has been called the material school in naval policy. He found the large battleship the dominant type of fighting ship and he bent his whole ingenuity to making it larger and more formidable still but without sufficient consideration of what the actual conditions of its employment in a future war were likely to be. Again, he realized the value of the submarine and did much to develop it. He understood that it made considerable invasion in the face of a strong and undefeated fleet impossible. But he never seems to have worked out the problem of offense against submarines, used in the way that they were sure to be used by a weaker naval power. The result was that a half of our naval effort in shipbuilding before the war was wasted so far as this war is concerned; and if Lord Fisher had not bluffed the Germans into building dreadnaughts too, three-fourths of it would have been wasted. It is not true to say that the problem of the submarine had not been recognized before the war; in the summer of 1914 Admiral Sir Percy Scott had hailed it as the weapon of the future and a long correspondence had taken place on his views in the columns of the London Times. Yet in spite of the enormous preponderance of the British state in sea power, this particular question never seems to have been worked out at the Admiralty, and we are paying for the neglect now. True, no one could have foreseen that the German submarines would run amuck amongst the merchant navies of all the world, but the problem of protecting merchant shipping is one of destroying the submarine, and it is only because we failed to give that sufficient attention before the war that building to replace losses has assumed such enormous importance. The destruction of the submarine is now to be the sole thought of Admiral Jellicoe and his naval war staff. But if our peace organization at the Admiralty had been better, more real and less conventional—less *paperassier* as the French say—this work would have been done before the war.

It may be, of course, that the problem of the submarine is insoluble and in that case there is an end to naval power as we have hitherto understood it. For if the submarine is a weapon of offense against which there is no answer, the weakest naval power, if only it has command of and the means of manufacturing submarines, is the equal of the strongest. These conclusions, however, are unlikely; for the balance between attack and defense, though constantly weighed down on one side or the other, always tends to return to equilibrium. These are large problems which will not be solved definitely in this war or for years after it. The immediate problem is to build merchant ships to replace those lost and to build swarms of destroyers and patrol boats which would keep losses down to a level that could be made good. Even if we had to rebuild our whole merchant marine every year, the problem is not insoluble. England built 2,000,000 tons of new shipping in the year before the war. England and America both have only to double that and we have a palliative that will at any rate serve for the purposes of this war, though of course it will not cure the malady from which sea power is suffering. It is a great comfort to Englishmen at a time like this to know that America is working at the same problem as themselves. The time will come when America's military help will be necessary to finish off the war. But the time has come when the help of American business men and American inventors are a necessary condition of the professional activity of armies and fleets. England hopes to end the war by calling in men of the type of Sir Eric Geddes. America has many such men. Let her begin by calling them in. England is grateful for the assistance of the Amer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ican navy in European waters, and the exchange of messages between Admiral Sims and Admiral Beatty has stirred our imagination. In particular Englishmen have noted how Admiral Beatty's phrase of "chivalry of the seas" is used as an English translation of the equivalent American phrase "freedom of the seas." But the real reserve of the United States in this war is not after all what we may call the line or the professional reserve, but its amateur and territorial reserve, mobilized from the business house, the workshop and the study.

H. SIDEBOTHAM.

Manchester, England.

The Filibusters—Ten Weeks Later

PERHAPS, if the war had not come, the senators charged with defeating the "armed neutrality" bill with a filibuster, in March, might have had better opportunity of clearing themselves of some of the unsparing criticism they received at that time. Of the eight who held over from the last session—Cummins, Gronna, Kenyon, Kirby, LaFollette, Norris, Stone and Vardaman—more than one had an excellent record in ordinary peace-time legislation. Ordinary peace times might have offered a chance; but the war has obscured them, and left for them only the attitude of intolerance which they won for themselves three months ago. It is not necessary to accept Mr. Vardaman's theories of diplomacy, or to imply that Senator Stone is in any way fitted for the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations, to realize that much of the criticism which these men still bear is not fair. From the actual work of war preparation the eight filibustering senators have not held back sullenly.

In the early reactions to the war resolution, when many senators were somewhat bewilderedly turning back to their old interests and finding that they no longer existed, the group of filibusters showed at least an average possession of adaptability. One of the first measures to be brought up in the Senate, after April 5th, was the Sundry Civil Appropriations bill which had failed of passage in the previous session. In spite of the new conditions this measure remained of the familiar omnibus type, carrying numerous local gifts of one sort or another. Only one protest was made against the lack of adjustment displayed in the bill: Mr. Kenyon realized that forty thousand dollars appropriated for a postoffice in Sandpoint, Idaho—993 people—is not compatible with the demands of a war budget; and though he received no support in his contention, he stated, "I take this occasion to say that in my judgment we ought not to commence any public buildings at this time unless there is some unusual reason for it."

How well the whole group of filibusters have managed to grasp a new and unwelcome set of standards is surprising. Senator Norris, who had been ready to appeal to his constituency to determine whether he was not accurately representing their wishes in opposing the preliminaries of war, urged, two days after war was declared, that Congress take steps to provide the army with plenty of aviation fields, situated, so as to benefit practice, in various altitudes. So limited are our training facilities at the present day that we have been obliged to send recruits to fields established by the private enterprise of manufacturers of aeroplanes. A week later Mr. Kenyon acquainted the Senate, almost for the first time, with the existence of a serious problem in food shortage, by introducing a resolution calling upon the Secretary of Agriculture to inform the Senate what steps he had taken to provide for an increased production. And about the same time Senator Stone pointed out that service in the ranks of the American army was less remunerative than sweeping the halls and corridors outside the Senate chamber, and made a plea for better terms as a matter of justice and a stimulant to recruiting in those branches of the service where volunteering is still necessary. Later on, when the conscription bill was being debated, Mr. Kenyon took up the same argument, and it is due to an amendment which he introduced that the men who are to serve in France will not receive wages approximately half as large as those paid in the Canadian overseas regiments.

The first discussion of the policy of paying for the war so far as is practicable by taxation came when the bond issue bill was under consideration in the Senate. Though the revenue bill was not to be introduced for a month, three members—Stone, Kenyon and Kirby, all in the group of filibusters—urged that the President be supported in his plea for a war largely sustained by the present generation. Nor is this discussion, which anticipated the meeting of the issue by seven weeks, the only instance of foresight in financial matters shown by a member of the filibustering group. To the present day there has been but one argument in the Senate for the desirability of taxing government bonds: on April 17th, Senator Stone declared: "We propose to concentrate and lock up two thousand million dollars of the nation's surplus wealth in bonds. . . . It is impossible for me to believe that a great interest-bearing, non-taxable public indebtedness, represented in the form of bonds, is a public blessing." Substantially

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this is the theory that has been put forward by many good economists, and totally ignored in both houses.

The position of several of the filibusters, particularly Mr. Cummins and Mr. LaFollette, in the matter of the Espionage bill is better known. It has become the majority thing to do, lately, to take sides against censorship, and the last attempt to put a censorship provision into the Espionage bill failed by a vote of 48 to 34. But before the present supply of publicity was available, there were early attempts made in the Senate to eliminate restrictions on the publication of news. In the last session Senator Cummins offered nine amendments—all of them defeated—to break the rigidity of the censorship provisions. In the present session he was again at the head of the opposition, and moved, on April 20th, to strike out the section in dispute. The movement against censorship, however, had not yet gained enough in conviction or publicity, and his motion was voted down, 40 to 34. It was only when the bill came up again, three weeks later, that several new converts came in with prepared speeches, and a few additional votes, that an end to the issue was apparently reached.

In participating to this considerable degree in the dispatch of war measures, the filibustering members have managed not to be indifferent to matters of domestic interest. Other senators, by virtue of position as committee chairmen, have contributed more in the direct handling of one war bill or another; but no group of members, it can fairly be said, has so far been better able to straddle the issues abroad and at home. Mr. Gronna has been at work to get consideration for a corrupt practices act, just as if the war had not wiped out interest in the status of politics at home. Mr. Kenyon has introduced a bill for a national budget, and pointed out that the United States and Turkey are the only two civilized nations without a budget system of some sort. All members of the group have participated in a matter so purely domestic that it attracted no outside attention in the newspapers: the appeal, on March 26th, of the employees of the Washington Railway and Electric Company for an investigation of that company's high-handed suppression of collective bargaining and the right of fair appeal. In response to the employees' petition, Senator Hughes brought a resolution into the Senate, providing for the appointment of an investigating committee. This resolution Mr. Smoot moved to the Committee on the District of Columbia. Such a course would at least have meant a delay, with a falling off in local interest and less chance of a successful outcome for the employees. Senators who believed in making Washington safe for democracy also feared that it would mean a complete end to the resolution. The result was a roll-call fairly indicative of sentiment: Mr. Smoot's motion was voted down, 36 to 30—with all of the filibusters, save two who were absent, voting in the 36—and members of such notorious opposition to progressive principles as Messrs. Gallinger, Penrose, Smoot, Lodge, and Sherman, in the 30.

It is in the last matter which the Senate has had under consideration, however, that the interest shown by this group of men has had its most substantial effect. The first administration food bill was brought into the Senate on May 21st. There was every reason, then, why it should have been advanced, if not promptly, at least connectedly. But from the bill itself the discussion shifted to a point of order. Against this waste of time an objection was made, not by one of the senators who had willed the war, but by Mr. Norris: "Those who have been talking about hurrying and speeding things up realize that the food proposition is one of the important considerations. . . . But we have devoted an entire legislative day to a discussion of a motion to recommit. I am not finding fault with that, but it seems when we get through with this day's work it has been understood all the time that the bill is going to be recommitted. Then why waste all this eloquence?"

That the bill was put through as promptly as it was, is due in great measure to the efforts of Mr. Kenyon. After the discussion had gone on with considerable aimlessness for eight days, Senator Jones, who had no reason for a partial comment, declared, "I think if this is a war measure we ought not to have been adjourning from day to day, taking hours for the consideration of other matters in the morning hour, but we should have been pushing it at all times of the day. I have not seen very much insistence upon getting a vote upon the bill, except upon the part of the Senator from Iowa." Mr. Kenyon performed a varied service. He pointed out the inconsistency of refusing to permit the government to sell seeds to the farmers—while several hundred thousand dollars was being spent annually for the Congressional distribution of free seeds; he answered, in a sensible fashion, the sly criticisms which certain Republican and Democratic members had made of Mr. Herbert Hoover; he protested when Mr. Calder and other senators sought to swing the discussion to irrelevant topics, with a plea for "more common sense and a little less oratory." There have not been many instances in which a general measure has received more guidance from a single senator, and one not a member of the administration party.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Aside from the support given in this way by individual filibusters in the consideration of war measures, there is certain general evidence to illustrate their attitude as a group. The matter of introducing bills is not an infallible guide, but it is in the aggregate a good test of intention. So far, in the present session, 2,469 bills have been introduced in the Senate. Of this number the vast majority have been for pensions and local improvements, and not more than 307 are what might broadly be termed "public" bills. This is a rate, for the whole Senate, of 12 per cent. But the eight filibusters, with 25 "public" bills in a total of 77 introduced, have an average two and a half times as great—32 per cent. They stand well, too, in the matter of attendance. General absence has been an unfortunate characteristic of a session with measures of such consequence to be acted upon. The average attendance of the Senate on the 79 roll-calls since the declaration of war has been 41; the average of the eight filibusters has been 54. Without subscribing in any way to individual theories of foreign policy, it should be apparent that simply on the basis of support given to war measures there is good ground for a new estimate of a group of men who have endured, and are still enduring, a censure that has not often been matched in bitterness.

CHARLES MERZ.

At the Capitol

"IT will not be very long," said Representative Norton in the House, on Saturday, "until our allies, so-called, will be saying that they will condescend to help us to carry on this war. I realize that England would be perfectly willing that this nation should take the entire burden off her hands. . . . It is about time that we stopped and considered the interest of our own people and proceeded on a program to fight our own part in this war without taking upon ourselves the burden of our so-called allies."

There has been recently a growing uneasiness in both houses of Congress over the scope which American participation is evidently to take. Senator Harding's widely published declaration, "It is not up to the United States to force democracy on to the world" is but one of many less advertised but more pointed indications of disagreement. Open expressions of concern have come, it is true, chiefly from those who were initially opposed to the war; but the tendency toward plain speaking has not been gratified until recently, and members who have been silent since the declaration of war are beginning to state their convictions less guardedly upon the floors of both houses.

It is natural that the decisions which are now being made should cause disagreement and awaken opposition, and there are instances of both disagreement and opposition in the record of the past week. Few of them, however, have been far-sighted or calculated upon in advance. Senator Harding's declaration was not an indication of an effort to change the course of the war, or even a preliminary move in Republican partisanship, but a remark to which he had been provoked by Senator Lewis. Mr. Lewis, whose newspaper reputation as Democratic "whip" is a handicap to that party in Congress, and an affliction outside of it, had opened a cheap discussion with a fling at the effects of Mr. Harding's "personal pulchritude and manly beauty" on "a bevy of beauteous women." That he came off as lightly as he did, is regrettable. Mr. Norton's declaration that England was ready to shift its war burdens to this country was made when he was opposing a bill that simply extended the life of the War-Risk Insurance Bureau. Comparatively there was more opposition—and expression of disagreement with the conduct of the Allies—in the discussion of a bill giving the President control over the sale and distribution of explosives than in the consideration of the major war measures. Where dissatisfaction with the character of American participation has been expressed in action, it has usually been, so far, in some matter relatively insignificant.

One form in which this unwillingness has shown itself, particularly during the past week—an unwillingness of many members to believe that the United States is entering into full military as well as economic partnership with the Allies—is in the matter of government contracts. Ignorant of administrative action, there is uneasiness lest that action is tying Congress to a longer and broader war program than many members would of themselves choose. And with this apprehension is mingled a certain regret that Congressmen are apparently not to influence greatly the awarding of contracts. Many members are alarmed at the far-reaching and suddenly acquired powers of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense. The Senate has no confirmatory control over appointments to the Commission, and its swift development into eighty sub-committees was not foreseen in either branch of Congress. It was concern, perhaps mingled with some resentment, which led the Senate to write into the Urgent Deficiencies bill a section providing that "the existence of war shall not be construed as enlarging the powers or duties of the Council of National Defense, but that such powers and duties shall remain as prescribed by the act creating said Council." Naturally, however, no such purely formal prohibition has been able to suppress the expansion caused by immediate war needs, and the fears of Congress are still alive. At present the daily complaints about usurpation of power and unfairness in distributing contracts are being answered by administration leaders with generalities. But to meet the increasing discontent, one member of the Committee on Appropriations has suggested that "there should be created at once a body, small in size, composed of men who are officers of the government—not necessarily existing officers—to supervise and control the letting of all contracts, hear complaints, and be practically a body of appeal."

Much of the uneasiness in Congress arises, of course, in the fact that vast amounts have been set aside for the war in lump-sum appropriations. With the lack of any adequate system of accounting this uneasiness is natural; but it is a comment on consistency that the same concern over the dangers of the lump-sum method has not been so prevalent in the consideration which the House has given this week to the Rivers and Harbors bill. This measure, a subject for banter at all times when it is not actually under discussion, has been able to appear on this occasion in the unfamiliar guise of a war measure. It contains certain items of a military value, but with them are bound up

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ones such as the Congaree river project—which sets aside $100,000 for a stream whose traffic in 1914 required three steamboats, in 1915, two, and in 1916 got down to one stern-wheeler. As in all omnibus bills it is almost necessary to pass the doubtful items to get at the better ones; for if one stave is knocked out, the barrel falls. By combining the membership of the House with four hundred items judiciously distributed among forty-eight states, the bill is calculated to pass itself.

Nevertheless, the project for a permanent commission of engineers, to recommend and expend the appropriations for river and harbor improvement, is receiving more support than in the past it has ever had; and the bill itself was met with a demand for revision, though it had had the advertising of a war measure, and came at a time when twenty-seven million dollars is an almost ordinary sum. War is supplying evidence of the shortcomings of the present system of making appropriations; on Friday, Mr. Sherley declared to a House better filled than is usually the case, "We need in America not to keep dividing up power, not to keep separating it, so that nobody can abuse it, but to put it with responsibility, so that when it is abused those who are responsible for the abuse can be punished. Think what has happened in the House of Representatives. We undertook to change our rules here upon the theory that the Speaker had become a great boss and that we would prevent the abuse of power by taking power from him, and we created in lieu of that a dozen or more bosses, not one of whom is in any sense responsible and no one of whom can be held responsible for any abuse."

To come out of the war with so automatically adjustable a system of responsibility as England has, with a referendum always at hand for the opposition, is certainly not possible. But to go into the war with even one member, in a position so influential as Mr. Sherley's, continually bringing before Congress the way out of its embarrassments is in itself encouraging. It means that there will be at least a minority effort to use the war as a sign-board, and make it a reason for progress at home.

C. M.

A COMMUNICATION

To Conscientious Objectors

GENTLEMEN: Thirteen of your number have published recently in The New Republic a communication which is less a defense of your position than a plea for tolerance. Your spokesmen offer little direct argument to support the contention that a citizen always does right in refusing to render military service to his country; what is maintained is rather that, whether right or wrong, such citizens ought to suffer no hardship because of their obedience to the actual dictates of their consciences. Yet it it is not mere exemption from legal penalties that is claimed in your behalf; it is also exemption from social reprehension. There is to be created in America "a social setting sufficiently hospitable to all conscientious objectors." But the desirability of this, surely, depends upon whether the position of the conscientious objector is ethically defensible. It is possibly true that polygamists should not be put in jail; yet we should scarcely wish to "create a social setting hospitable" to polygamy, unless we were persuaded that a society based upon this form of marital relation is a desirable one.

It is, in short, impossible to judge fairly a plea for the kind and degree of toleration claimed for your conduct, without first raising the question whether the thing to be tolerated is a good thing or a bad thing. It is, as your representatives incontrovertibly remark, a fact—possibly even a "tremendous fact" that you exist; yet it seems not irrelevant to inquire whether you ought to exist. I venture then to present some reflections concerning this prior question.

The "conscientious objector" whom the signers of the plea have in mind is "the type of man to whom (military) participation in war is tantamount to committing murder," and who therefore can not be coerced "by any human power on God's earth" into such participation. He is, in short, the person who is opposed, not merely to this or that war, but to all wars; who condemns not one side only, but both sides, in any armed conflict; and who refuses obedience to all laws placing upon him military duties.

1. There is implicit in this doctrine of yours a generalization which to many of us seems either very strange ethics or else very strange history—the generalization, namely, that there never has been at stake, and never will be, any human good sufficiently important to be worth fighting for. Your thesis means, for example, that it would have been better that religious liberty should never have been attained. For, as we very well know, it was attained and (in some countries) kept only because, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were men in the Netherlands, in England, in France and in Germany, who were ready to kill, and upon occasion did kill, other men who sought to deprive them of that liberty. If the friends of freedom of thought, in the circumstances of that time, had followed your principles, the history of all Europe, for the past three hundred years, would in all probability have been much like the history of Spain. For the enemies of freedom are seldom troubled by your scruples. Your thesis, again, means that it would have been better if the Ottoman Turks—whose record in the Balkan Peninsula we know—had set up their empire over the whole of southeastern Europe. For they were prevented from doing so only by that long fight which was kept up with fluctuating fortunes for more than two centuries by Hungary, Austria, Poland and Venice. Your thesis means, finally, that it would have been better if the American Republic had never been established. For it was established and could have been established only at the cost of what you are pleased to call "murders" committed by the "embattled farmers" at Concord (whose praises were sung by that "Ralph Emerson" whom you so oddly admit to your pantheon) and by Washington and his followers on a hundred battlefields.

To the rest of us, then, as we consider your position in the light of history, you seem persons whose sense of moral and social values has been perverted by an obsession. One

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evil—truly a very great evil—looms so large in your imagination, that, to escape it, you would have mankind endure all other evils; one good appears to you so precious, that to keep it you would sacrifice everything else that makes up the fabric of civilization.

2. Those who judge your doctrine thus, can not but look upon you as playing an unpleasantly parasitic part in the history of human progress. Other services you may, you doubtless do, render; but the costliest service of all, a service sometimes indispensable to the cause of justice or of order or of liberty, you refuse. It is upon other men's blood that you live, in so far as any of those values which others have fought for, or are now fighting for, are dear to you also. The freedom, the security, perhaps even the lasting peace based upon a reign of justice and law, which your sons, as we all hope, will enjoy, other men's sons have died, or will yet die, to win. Can you, after all, feel surprise when the fathers of those dead sons look upon you and *your* sons with something less than admiration or liking?

It is true that, at such a time as this, all who are debarred by age or physical disqualification from sharing in the ultimate service must feel themselves to be living by that very tragic kind of parasitism to the bitterness of which Kipling has given the ultimate expression in The Children. But *your* position is that of men who *choose* to have no part in the sacrifices by which, nevertheless, they do in fact profit. You plead for freedom not to fight. But the freedom even to make that plea you possess only because men in the past have fought for it. You are, indeed, the men who would never have done violence to further any evil cause. But you are also the men upon whom no good cause, in its direst peril, could ever have relied for effectual support.

3. Apparently what chiefly prevents you from realizing keenly this aspect of your position is a certain comprehensible but dangerous confusion of ideas. If *all* men in the past had refused to go to war, or otherwise use violence, there would have been no wars and no oppression. Is not, then—you perhaps ask—a rule of conduct which, if universally adopted, would produce results so beneficent, necessarily a good rule? The answer is that it would be good only under the condition specified; and that that is a condition contrary to fact. Not all men do now act upon your principles; nor can it very confidently be expected that all will soon begin to do so. But the test of a rule of conduct lies in its results in the real, not in an imaginary, world. And if all believers in humane ideals and in free government adhered to your rule, while the forces hostile to those ideals followed a very different rule, the inevitable result is clear; the cause of freedom and of humanity would be betrayed in the house of its friends. Oppression, intolerance and injustice would always go armed, while liberty—having taken folly for counsellor—would expose itself defenseless to their attack.

4. I seem, however, to see in your attitude also the influence of a habit of mind, not uncommon among humanitarians, which may be called ethical optimism. I mean by this a habitual disregard of the painful fact that good must often be purchased at the cost of what—in itself—is very real, and sometimes very great, evil. Anti-vivisectionists seem usually to exemplify this attitude. While the suffering caused by experimentation upon animals is frequently and grossly exaggerated, it remains, I suppose, true that a good deal of suffering is involved. And that men should inflict pain upon sentient and affectionate creatures that they have in their power is an abominable thing. Only, it is a still more abominable thing that rational beings should knowingly sacrifice a greater good to a lesser; should, through reluctance to give pain to a few animals, permit the human race, for generations, to be tortured by preventible plagues. Anti-vivisectionists seem unwilling to believe the world to be so ill ordered that the one evil is the only means of avoiding the other. So you, too, seem resolved not to face the fact that the highest ends can at times be attained only by the most tragic of means. That youths should be sent out armed to kill or maim other youths is an unspeakably abominable thing; but it is yet more abominable that through horror at this evil, the lovers of peace should become the silent partners of those that make and would perpetuate war, and that our youth should be bred up to sit by with folded hands while others are made the victims of lawless violence.

5. You will, perhaps, permit me to say in conclusion that sympathy for your position is scarcely increased by a certain line of reasoning followed by your protagonists in their manifesto. Their tone, throughout, is one of assured and condescending moral superiority; and the assumption of such superiority is expressly made one of the premises of the argument which is to persuade the rest of us to favor your exemption from military duties. You, it is urged, are at all costs to be kept safe, like queen-bees in the hive, because you constitute an elect class of "humanists," of "visionaries," who alone are capable of the "reconstructive task" of "recreating out of bloody chaos some new reinspired 'internationalism." For this high duty of the future, it seems, those who serve in the war will be disqualified, because "brutalized" and "degraded" through that service.

It is, I suppose, hopeless to attempt to convey to you a sense of the feeling produced in some minds by this ineffably modest argument. Your spokesmen have apparently been undisturbed by any surmise that there is something humorous—but not agreeably humorous—in a proposal, on the part of a group of men, that they and their own particular type shall be specially preserved from both physical and moral risks, upon the ground that they have a superior or exclusive moral fitness to be the future leaders of the race. With those who regard such a proposal as altogether natural and suitable, I certainly have no desire to reason. It may, however, not be useless to observe that there seems a good deal of presumption—in more than a logical sense of the term—in taking it for granted that moral idealism and "sheer humanity" are, in the present crisis, the peculiar possession of those who keep far from the hazards of the battle-line. Every teacher of youth, every reader of the biographic literature of the war, knows what generous loyalties, what sense of arduous obligation, what visions of a world set free from the shadow of war itself, have taken, or are taking, men into the training camps and the trenches. It is not for you, gentlemen, to hold a tone of condescension towards these men! Nor have you read the records of this or previous wars to much profit, if you assume that even those who enter the struggle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from high motives must inevitably be "brutalized" and "degraded" by the experience. Take a few names almost at random from the Civil War—Lee, Jackson, Thomas, Robert Gould Shaw, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Henry Lee Higginson, Charles Francis Adams, Nathaniel S. Shaler, Justice Holmes. Such brutal and degraded characters as these seem to most of us, after all, to represent types not without a potential function in a progressive and pacific society. It is not, at any rate, because we shall not elsewhere be able to find men worthy to lead in national and international reconstruction, that we shall feel constrained to release you from a hazard which all the rest of your countrymen of military age will be called upon to face.

There remains the ulterior question of toleration. Into the reasons—which seem to me in large part mistaken reasons—offered by your spokesmen in support of their contention upon this point, there is no space to enter; nor is it needful to do so. From the conclusion that genuinely "conscientious" objectors should be given non-combatant duties to perform, few, I take it, will dissent. Your number appears to be small; and of your scruples, the country may well be generously considerate. I have sought only to set before you a part of the reasons why many who favor extending toleration to your refusal of a recognized civic duty, regard this, nevertheless, as the toleration, not simply of an erroneous opinion, but also of an anti-social attitude and mode of conduct.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

Baltimore, Maryland.

CORRESPONDENCE

What Montclair is Doing

SIR: For the woman who "does not call herself patriotic" I have no message, but for the woman who can endure a conversation on the subject, I am glad to send a suggestion. It is one not of theory but of actual fact. It tells about eleven hundred women and two hundred young girls in one small town who are not ashamed to be called "patriotic" and yet who are using the term not for "sentimentality" nor for "self-advertising" but for a merely human amount of "efficiency." The organization of which they are members is locally but a year old.

I will mention only a part of the work of the past three months:

Eighty units of about ten each meet regularly once a week making surgical dressings, surgical clothing, etc.

Fifty emergency beds in the Mountainside Hospital are now nearly completely equipped with the type outfits of sheets, pillow-cases, surgical shirts, pajamas, bed-socks, towels, etc. These beds will be available for any emergency due to war such as an explosion in a nearby munitions works. In connection with them a sufficient supply of surgical dressings has been stored and the women are now trained to take care of any local emergency that may arise. Therefore the later work of the "units" mentioned above now goes directly to France. Not because that is "humanitarian" work but because they are "*our* allies."

When the local militia, "K" Company, was ordered out recently, the automobile committee assisted in their mobilization and the only food they got from Sunday night to late Monday was what the Commissariat Committee provided. Since that time several occasions have arisen when national guardsmen doing guard duty in the vicinity but at some distance from food supplies, have been fed—always at very short notice. To get ready for such work in an "efficient" manner, many of the women organized and worked in a course in "canteen cooking" under a competent director who gave costs and food-values. The Montclair Battalion has been doing guard duty in night shifts. The Commissariat Committee has provided midnight lunches for them.

When "K" Company was located "somewhere in Jersey," such "practical" wants as a loan fund for spending money—(Do you know how Uncle Sam pays the soldiers?)—field typewriter, messenger motor, etc.,—were got for them, as well as the usual gifts dear to the female heart, the tender chocolate and the sentimental cigarette.

Before our official recruiting tent was opened with due and patriotic ceremony, the Society's headquarters were at the disposal of the recruiting officer and its telephone and messengers worked for him.

Knitted "sets"—sleeveless jackets, wristlets and mufflers—for the navy, socks for the army, and aviation sets are needs that women can meet. The knitting section of this society is now completing its two hundred and fiftieth set—and going strong.

A call came from a certain base hospital for reading matter. Within two hours a package of *recent* and appropriate magazines (not the Millinery Number of Vogue and the Ladies' Home Journal for 1914) were in the express office. Instances of this sort could be multiplied.

The garden movement became important. The organization did not immediately make that movement its own. It simply got in touch with the regular gardening organizations—the Mayor's Food Committee, the Plant, Fruit and Flower Guild, and again used its headquarters and its personnel to coöperate in active work along lines suggested by the garden specialists.

I have mentioned only some of the things lately and already done.

Ten young women who have completed courses in home nursing, first aid and diet cooking are now ready to go into the hospital and complete training to take the place of nurses to be ordered to the front. They are only a beginning—these ten. Such other classes as are necessary to the successful prosecution of all work as it arises are provided for from time to time.

A number of houses are already registered to be used as convalescent homes. Some of these are to be turned over entirely, but for the most part the offer is of one to six rooms, with competent care. The care is planned in this way: One person from the organization has charge of the cooking and care of the patient. A visiting nurse and a regular physician will take general supervision over all.

The mobilization of all work is accomplished through a telephone and an automobile committee.

But I do not recount these things because I think they are of any consequence in themselves. They are, we all know, very very little! All too little! I only go over them because I wish to point out that at least here *is* such an organization, working steadily at steady things, but also ready to be called on for any unforeseeable emergency

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—a sort of civilian light cavalry with no red tape on its bridle.

A. H. S.,

Montclair Chapter National Special Aid Society.

P. S.—And then there is always the Red Cross.

For Principles of Settlement

SIR: The undersigned citizens of the United States respectfully submit their opinion that the high aims which have led the government to formulate its present policy of armed action against Germany, require that immediately the terms of a just and permanent peace be formulated by the United States and announced to the belligerent powers. We have entered the war to defend justice and free institutions and to promote an organization of the civilized nations which shall make possible the elimination of the waste and horror of war as a means of settling international conflicts of interest. In no more significant way can we make it clear to the world that the United States is seeking only the restoration of just and equitable international relations than by stating with precision and clarity the exact adjustments of the issues involved in the war which we regard as essential to the welfare of humanity and the peace of the world.

In the present crisis, it is not only important that our aims should be clearly understood by the neutral and belligerent Powers, but in order that the high purposes to which we are devoting the lives and property of our citizens may not come to naught, it is imperative that we should understand them ourselves. There is danger that in the passion and suffering of conflict, the original ideals which moved us to war upon Germany will be forgotten in the desire to win and the eagerness for military and naval triumphs. Once the hostile instincts are aroused, and the inevitable hatred and intolerance that accompany killing are loosed, what is now to us a means may easily become an end. In the heat and passion of destruction, even though devoted to high human purposes, it is necessary constantly to keep vivid and clear the primary ends for which we have been willing to kill and destroy.

An early statement of peace terms would operate powerfully in shaping a liberal opinion in neutral and belligerent countries. Neutral countries would be confirmed in their faith in our integrity of purpose. In the belligerent nations such a statement from the nation which is now recognized as the decisive factor in the war, would crystallize liberal sentiment and further the purposes for which all belligerents have declared. The effect upon the Central Powers would be most salutary. It is known that there are large liberal elements in Germany and Austria that need only to be convinced of the sincerity of our declared purposes to bring overwhelming pressure upon their governments to come to terms. If such pressure is successful, the ends we are fighting for might be secured promptly and easily, without the loss of millions of lives. We cannot look on with equanimity at the pouring of these lives into the holocaust until an attempt at least has been made to give final union and strength to the liberal forces of the world that have already been brought to life by the President's address of April 2nd.

Believing that these considerations make a clear statement of peace terms imperative for the United States, we suggest the following proposals, which, in our opinion, should be incorporated in such a declaration:

1. No annexations by any belligerent.

2. Plebiscite where practicable as in Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, administered by neutrals.

3. All indemnities to be internationalized.

4. No trade discriminations or boycotting agreements against any nation after the war.

5. Organization of the nations for peace, Germany included.

6. International control of the undeveloped areas of the world with a full provision for investment by all Powers.

RICHARD C. TOLMAN.
JAMES G. STEVENS.
H. K. DENNIS.
R. S. LOOMIS.
PAUL H. DOUGLAS.
DUNCAN A. MCINNES.
O. S. BEYER.

Urbana, Illinois.

Believes in German Revolution

SIR: The great appeal is that this is a war for democracy. What is democracy? If it be a government of the people, by the people, for the people, it does not exist. If it be a government seeking the just welfare and the fullest liberty of all its citizens, it does not exist. If a democracy be that government which best cares for its masses as valuable assets, it exists only in Germany. England and America permit the fullest freedom in the exploitation of the people, with no obligation to care for them except by charity. America particularly has the vice of apparent freedom which is not freedom at all, but a feudal system of land tenure which automatically generates monopolies and privileges in a few at the top and slums at the bottom. In clean cities, absence of slums, care of the workers and a socialized society, Germany leads the world. But, we are told, this socialized democracy is imposed on the German people by a military despotism and we must save the Germans from themselves. The President has said we have no quarrel with the German people. That is a very valuable and important statement. Its importance cannot be exaggerated. It ought in every possible way to be made clear to the German people. We must not forget, however, that the German army and navy are also the German people and just now we are certainly preparing to fight them. The German people may well reply to our good intentions, "We will take care of our military despotism ourselves, if you will only give us a chance to attend to our own affairs." This suggests the most important single consideration in the whole problem. Let us give the German people, our own citizens and the world to understand we will help the revolution now impending in Germany; we will at once make friends with the German people which has cast off its military despotism; we will conclude a peace with a reorganized Germany, regardless of European diplomacy, and we have no quarrel whatever with the German people after they have separated themselves from the autocracy which brought on the war. That would be good diplomacy, good war strategy, good morals and common sense.

Our American citizens of German birth or descent would help put this over. They left Germany to avoid militarism and have no love for Junkerdom. They do love the Fatherland and their blood kin. What sort of people would they be if they did not? Let us make it very clear we have no quarrel with the plain German people.

CHARLES ERSKINE SCOTT WOOD.

Portland, Oregon.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books and Things

MOST of the men I know best voted last autumn for President Wilson. Most of them did it after a good deal of hesitation, did it recalcitrantly, biased by reading and meditating the speeches of Mr. Hughes. Nearly all, however, admired Mr. Wilson's addresses of February third and April second, although they would have liked them better yet if the President had said "duty" instead of "plain duty," "frankly" instead of "very frankly," and if he had not said "proud punctilio." These exceptions made, the speeches Mr. Wilson has lately been delivering do not arride these friends of mine, who are punctilious without being proudly punctilious, and meticulous not without being morbidly meticulous. Some of them read him with pain, others with a pleasure not free from malice.

Attempts to explain their state of mind are all the harder for me because it resembles my own. I am talking, of course, about those men who are in nowise malicious. You suggest, perhaps, that each of them had in childhood an experience which predisposed him to distaste for Mr. Wilson's recent speeches? Yes, that is possible, certainly possible. I should not care, by calling it impossible, to range myself with those who go up and down the world always denying that the improbable has occurred. But is not the matter easier of access on the other side? Instead of trying to guess what Mr. Wilson's mind is like by exploring their feeling about it, why not try to get at their feeling by taking a look at a bit of his mind?

Let us choose, for this purpose, a passage where the substance attracts more attention than the words. Or else, if we are so unhappily constituted that such a passage is not so easy to find, let us disregard our sorrow that the President's vocabulary has lost so few female adjectives since the United States went to war, that the adjective is still the enemy of the executive.

Perhaps this extract will do—from the address Mr. Wilson made last week to the United Confederate Veterans: "These are days of oblivion as well as of memory; for we are forgetting the things that once held us asunder. Not only that, but they are days of rejoicing, because we now at last see why this great nation was kept united, for we are beginning to see the great world purpose which it was meant to serve. Many men, I know, particularly of your own generation, have wondered at some of the dealings of Providence, but the wise heart never questions the dealings of Providence, because the great, long plan as it unfolds has a majesty about it and a definiteness of purpose, an elevation of ideal, which we were incapable of conceiving as we tried to work things out with our own short sight and weak strength." And again, a few sentences later: "At the day of our greatest division there was one common passion among us, and that was the passion for human freedom. We did not know that God was working out in His own way the method by which we should best serve human freedom—by making this nation a great, united, indivisible, indestructible instrument in His hands for the accomplishment of these great things."

Such a passage is not the work of a mind for which a main attraction in difficult subjects is their difficulty. The doubt Mr. Wilson hoped to soothe is found tossing on its bed, with a temperature as high as ever, when he has finished his lullaby. His words are a soft answer to a hard question.

Even comparatively simple questions are answered here with uncostly ease. Are we quite so certain, if we impute to Providence, as Its motive for deciding our civil war as It decided it, a desire to keep the United States united for military use in the present war, are we quite certain that the means were adapted to this end? Suppose the South had split itself off from the North, suppose each of these two nations, afraid of the other, had treated itself to a large standing army. Suppose, finally, that the passion for making and keeping the world safe for democracy had burst upon these two nations at about the same time, and had risen high enough to wash each beyond fear of the other, and had swept both into this war. Might not the result have been that the southern states and the northern states would be less unready to-day for war than the United States is? This is not a certainty. Of course it isn't. It is a doubt which the President has called into being by his own freedom from doubt.

Our fathers have told us that some minds seek by preference the central difficulty of every subject they attack. Other minds decline to see even the difficulties that are posted conspicuously upon the subject's circumference, like sentinels on its outer walls. We should have to put Mr. Wilson into this second class, I am afraid, if we were to judge him by nothing but what he said to the Confederate Veterans about Providence.

Don't question the dealings of Providence, he advised the Confederate Veterans. Wait until you can see in these dealings majesty, elevation of ideal, definiteness of purpose. Then approve. "The wise heart never questions the dealings of Providence."

But this advice, as I discover by trying to follow it, makes me the judge of an ideal's elevation and the definiteness of a purpose, me the appraiser of majesty. I may not like such an arrangement. I may happen to require, no matter how well I think of myself, a criterion more objective than my uncertain and fitful power to recognize these things when I see them. As a judge of God's purposes I leave something to be desired. Had I been addressing the Confederate Veterans, say in late 1914 or early 1915, I might have said to them, out of my blindness: "God kept the United States one nation so that it might serve, throughout this world upheaval with whose causes we have no concern, to remind the warring nations how beautiful and lofty that nation is which preserves and values the blessings of peace. By God's help united we stand," so I might have told my hearers, "and, in strict accordance with His design, united we stand out of this war." And to-day, seeing my error, now when the great, long plan has been further unfolded, I should perhaps be regretting that I had so publicly misjudged the purposes of God.

President Wilson seems to imply that our later estimates of the dealings of Providence are always sounder than our earlier estimates. This, we may remember, was almost Monsieur d'Astarac's opinion of Providence's estimates of Itself. On an island in the Seine, one moonlit evening, he said to Jaques Tournebroche, who had left La Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque to enter his service:

"One cannot reproach Jehovah with having deceived himself as to the quality of his work. Although he saw that it was good, at the very first and in the ardor of composition, he was not slow to realize his mistake, and the Bible is filled with expressions of his dissatisfaction, which amounted often to ill-humor and even at times to anger. Never did artisan treat the products of his industry with more disgust and aversion. He even thought of destroying them, and as a matter of fact he did drown all except a few."

P. L.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lawyers and Legalism

Some Legal Phases of Corporate Financing, Reorganizing and Regulation, by Francis Lynde Stetson, James Byrne, Paul D. Cravath, George W. Wickersham, Gilbert H. Montague, George S. Coleman, and William D. Guthrie. New York: The Macmillan Co. $2.75.

IT is generally supposed to be a peculiar weakness of lawyers to worship formal theory and disregard fact. "Legalist" is the name we apply to the man who determines a course of action by its conformity with a preconceived logical conception, instead of looking to practical consequences. It is interesting to test out this impression on the essays collected in this volume. They are addresses made before the New York Bar Association by a group of eminent corporation lawyers. Three, by Messrs. Stetson, Byrne and Cravath, deal with the so-called private affairs of corporations—corporate bonds and mortgages, receiverships, foreclosure suits, reorganizations. Four deal with the relation of corporations to the public—an essay by Mr. Wickersham on the Sherman law, one by Mr. Montague on the recent Clayton and Federal Trade Commission acts, and two, from opposing points of view, on public service commissions, by Mr. Coleman and Mr. Guthrie.

If *a priori* reasoning is a peculiar weakness of lawyers, there is no trace of it in the legal field ploughed through in the first three essays. The practical corporation lawyer, with wide business connections, the adviser and daily associate of Wall Street financiers, gives little thought to theoretical principles, except as theory is a convenient systematizer and aid to memory and understanding. If a scheme of corporate reorganization is to be framed, he does not take as his starting point a logical principle, to be developed deductively into the perfect legal form. Rather, he begins with a very concrete picture of the result he wishes to attain. He draws upon a wide practical experience to point out the simplest and surest way of bringing the result about. He studies the cases and authorities, not to gratify any passion for jurisprudence, but to find out what the courts will let him do, how they will let him do it, and what machinery they can put at his disposal. The legal plan must be so composed that its practical effect on the corporation, on its stockholders, creditors, mortgagees, on its property and functions, can be forecast to a certainty. Since investors are to be asked to stake their money on the scheme, any vagueness or ambiguity may be fatal. Certainty that it will stand the practical test is the supreme requisite; logic and theory, and the consistency and interplay of concepts are negligible.

Very different is the situation in the field of public law described in the remaining four essays. Here we are not yet out of the domain of dogma, of question-begging phrases, of concepts that bear the appearance of self-evident truths, but dissolve into meaningless verbiage when we try to apply them to flesh and blood. Two examples will suffice. The administrative commission, one of the most important products of the last quarter century, was the outcome of a realization that the complex problems of governmental regulation called for a specialized skill, and a detailed investigation and knowledge that the courts, overburdened with litigation, could not supply. "The theory of regulation by commissions," Mr. Guthrie admits, "is inherently sound." Yet their most essential powers, the powers which alone have distinguished them from a mere political department of the government, he would curtail because they are inherently judicial, and because the exercise of judicial powers by any other body than a court is inconsistent with the sacrosanct principle of the separation of powers, a principle dating back to Magna Carta, adopted in our federal Constitution, and violated, in Mr. Guthrie's opinion, whenever the decision of a "controverted question of fact" is left to a commission.

The history of the Sherman law, traced by Mr. Wickersham, presents the other example, and it is a shining one. The law was enacted in 1890, after debates covering 220 pages of the Congressional Record. It affected, and was intended to affect, enormous private and public interests, and conferred on the courts most extensive powers over industry and commerce. Yet so vague and so ambiguous was its phraseology that virtually all the determining questions of policy which it was supposed to solve were left wide open, to be decided by the courts with hardly a guide from Congress. Was the law applicable to manufacturing concerns whose product was sold in interstate commerce? To railroads? To labor unions? Seven years after the law was enacted, five members of the Supreme Court held the law applicable to railroads, four thought it was not. In 1895 the court considered it an open question whether the law applied to labor unions; in 1908 it finally decided that it did. Five years after the law was enacted, the Supreme Court held that the "Sugar Trust" was not subject to the law, because it was engaged in manufacture, not commerce. Four years later, the decision was virtually overruled. As a mere question of legislative technique, the situation is amazing. It is as if Mr. Francis Lynde Stetson had drafted a railroad mortgage which left it an open question, on which a court could divide five to four, whether it covered the terminals, or only the roadbed, or neither, or both.

In other ways the law was equally ambiguous. Did it forbid all contracts or combinations which restrained trade, or only those which were illegal at common law? As Mr. Wickersham shows from the debates, Congress probably intended the latter; but until twenty-one years after the law was enacted, the Supreme Court was committed to the view that all restraints were illegal. Even after the Standard Oil decision, and up to the present moment, perhaps the most fundamental question of policy in the whole problem is still undecided. Does the law strike at size and power, or is it merely concerned with evil manifestations which may or may not spring from size and power? Does it hit only the "bad" trusts, or are all trusts bad? Does combination which acquires a dominating position in the industry through sheer efficiency, through the normal play of fair competition, and which does not abuse its power to the detriment of the public, fall foul of the law? Obviously this is a political question of the first magnitude and, from any rational point of view, should have been one of the first questions to be decided by Congress, before passing the law. Once made, the decision should have been unmistakably expressed in the law, so that business could be guided accordingly. Yet Congress left the matter to the courts, with not a hint to guide them in deciding it. Mr. Wickersham does not suggest an answer to the problem, though his approach is generally from the practical viewpoint. Were he not a well known admirer of the Sherman law, one would suspect a trace of irony in the conclusion of his essay, that the Sherman law has been "an effective instrument for the accomplishment of the purposes which the national legislature had in view upon its enactment."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The reason for this vagueness and uncertainty is obvious. Congress did not know what it was trying to bring about. All its political traditions were against any careful inquiry. It did not attempt to see concretely the form of organization it was aiming at. Instead it tried to enact a principle, variously phrased as free competition, or industrial liberty and equality, motivated by a vague emotion of hostility toward certain large corporations, and supposed to be enunciated in the common law phrase " restraint of trade." All the arduous work of reducing this phrase to concrete shape has been done by the courts.

It is an encouraging sign that a considerable portion of Mr. Wickersham's address is concerned with the practical problem of reorganizing corporations that have been found to be violating the Sherman law. Even more encouraging is the attempt made by Congress in the Clayton act, and described by Mr. Montague, to specify more clearly some of the illegal practices which the courts have condemned in administering the Sherman law. The attempt was not over-successful, in all probability; there are too many qualifications which introduce once more the uncertainties of the Sherman law. More promising, perhaps, was the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission, with expert jurisdiction over a large field formerly occupied by the Sherman law. Yet the new legislation, and the gradually accumulating experience of the courts, gives ground for hope that we are at last well under way on the long road which leads from the abstract to the concrete.

G. C. HENDERSON.

A German Rebel

A German Deserter's War Experience, translated by J. Koettgen. New York: B. W. Huebsch. $1.00.

THERE is a peculiarly striking internal proof of the authenticity of this anonymous experience. That proof is in the odd but welcome lack of a conventional literary method of approach—by very reason of which the true horror of war, incidentally rather than on purpose, is disclosed. The growth of insensitiveness in the combatant is sharply and poignantly revealed. Writing wholly from retrospect even the author recalls with a shock of new discovery that a few days after men had experienced nausea on viewing their first corpse in the streets of Belgium they calmly ate dinner, using the back of a dead horse for chairs and table. But a trained writer would have practised a less naïve selection; he would have kept an eye on the main chance of dramatic climax. There is no such suspicious marshalling of incidents in A German Deserter's War Experience, and just as the trivial incidents of the early days are recorded with no emphasis and no light and shade, so do the monotonous and awful scenes of sheer butchery towards the end of the book become almost a cliché in blood and filth. If the author had chosen to congratulate himself on his luck in escaping even minor bullet wounds, a shadow of doubt would descend over the whole narrative. It is his uncritical acceptance of his extraordinary luck that confirms one's faith in the story. There is no valid reason to question its truth.

Almost any book which honestly depicted the agony and dirt and brutalizing of human instincts that is the lot of every soldier in modern warfare might normally seem a work of supererogation to-day. There are hundreds of books which are nothing except the bitter expression of that disillusion. Yet those who have felt the impact of war most intimately are often reluctant to make their own reactions articulate. They leave that job to the authors and journalists who spend a few hours in the less exposed trenches, who in spite of every fair effort cannot completely pierce the romantic aura of war. It persists even in phraseology. So even the three years of unpicturesque killing have but barely reached the ordinary stay-at-home consciousness. Certainly in America it is still the gentleman's idea of war which obtains; it will hardly be shattered, except in a few homes, when our own first divisions come back broken men from across the seas. Imaginative blindness and popular ignorance of war's realities can still be assumed of us. Perhaps this book, with its purchase-provoking title, may do something to dissipate that ignorance and blindness. Prospective soldiers might avoid the book, for it is destructive of all decent army morale. Who can endure the passage where the author speaks of envy—the soldier's envy of the dead? The queer surface gaiety of the English " Tommy " is the best protection against that overwhelming despair. If the experiences recorded in this book could somehow seep into the perceptions of all of us, especially the old with their natural rigidity of mind, we should not have to concern ourselves about a League to Enforce Peace. As it is, it will rekindle our determination not to become swamped in the war to the point where we forget our chief purpose—not defeat of Germany so much as defeat of war as an institution. It is only by keeping alive that determination in public opinion that our entrance can be ultimately justified.

The encouraging side of this book is the quiet record of insubordination. Even the German army is not the unified mechanism, or the blindly disciplined machine, which it is our natural and lazy impulse to picture. Best of all, the men are not one-tenth as cruel as many outward acts of cruelty would seem to testify. In fact the men were often too sentimental, at least from the officers' point of view. I like the story of the soldier who was reprimanded for giving his bread allowance to a starving Belgian family. He threw the bread at the feet of the Lieutenant, saying quietly: " The duffers and idiots have to shed their blood to preserve also your junker family from the misery that has been brought upon this poor population." The soldier received only two weeks' " confinement," and it is a comfort that most of the soldiers refused to shackle their comrades. There were certain limits beyond which even German discipline was powerless. At one spot in a wood, where several hundred Germans surprised a few score Frenchmen, who threw down their arms when they saw the hopelessness of the situation, the officers went around among the soldiers ordering " no prisoners." And no prisoners were taken from that murdered body of defenseless men—the German soldiers had no choice but to obey. Yet in the dark certain officers were bayonetted in the back. Odd, was it not, since the French were unarmed? Odder still, that it was the officers who had given the " no prisoners " order that met this fate? That hatred of cruel officers works as a genuine ferment in the German army to-day. Nor is it wholly confined to the officers. Often, says the author, it extends to the government itself, which is being suspected more and more as the instigator of the whole war. A German Deserter's War Experience, with its directness and almost clumsy sincerity, is a chastening and thrilling book for all of us, but it is as a symbol of revolt that one will not wish to forget it. After all, the author writes only of the first few months of the war. Since then the spirit of insubordination cannot have become

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less. Reports of subterranean revolt have already reached us. And this book mirrors the origins, vividly and simply. It pictures the nucleus around which, as we so fervently hope, will slowly yet steadily gather the rising forces of anger and disillusion. It justifies one's faith that there is hope for a revolution—even in Germany. But its enduring service is in its ringing disclosure that even the French soldier fighting under the whip of hatred at wanton invasion does not loathe the instigators of this war more heartily than a few of the humblest of his German enemy.

H. S.

Conrad's New Story

The Shadow Line, by Joseph Conrad. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co. $1.35.

BEING a great innovator, Joseph Conrad can take, when he chooses, liberties which would seem, if a lesser artist took them with narrative forms, to exist for their own sake, with innovation as an end in itself. A story by Mr. Conrad often starts as if it were to sail with the wind; it goes easily and gathers way, it is almost within sight of some port of call, when suddenly the order is given to come about, and the story beats to windward, making long tacks, its purpose is forgotten, its course unaccountably changed.

Not until near the end of the story, if we are stupid, not even then if we are very stupid, does Mr. Conrad unseal our eyes. Once this miracle has been worked, however, we begin to see. We see that the narrative is intricate not because the artist, abounding in his strength, has piled difficulty upon difficulty that he may conquer them in creative joy, but because he has aimed always, and singly, at preparing us to share in his fresh insights, to feel the strangeness of places, to feel nature as no less alien when she seems man's friend than when she seems his enemy, to feel the strangeness of mankind as all the stranger for being inevitable. Mr. Conrad's path may seem at moments needlessly devious, wilfully zigzag, but he chooses it because it leads where he wants to go. He stalks the human heart. He takes his shy game unawares.

Now and then Mr. Conrad chooses to take no liberties with the old simple forms of narrative. This has been his choice in The Shadow Line, a story that goes straight from a beginning to an end.

A young man finds he has a few days on his hands, ashore, in an Eastern port about three days' steaming from Bangkok. A restlessness he cannot wholly explain has led him to give up his berth—a good one—and even to give up the sea itself for a while. He is returning to England. Then comes his chance, accident puts an independent command in his way, a sailing ship at Bangkok lacks a captain. From Bangkok, after a delay he can not help, and chafes under all the more because there is fever in the town, he sets sail down the Gulf of Siam. It takes him twenty-one days to make port, mostly days of light winds or none. Mate and all the crew fall sick of the fever. Everybody on board has it, except the young captain and Ransome, the ship's cook.

Yes, it is a slight story, for Mr. Conrad, although not so slight as you would think from this summary. For here, too, even when he does not wish to see deeper than several other men can, he has his own power of adding to our experience. It is we who live those endless windless days, it is our bodies that the rain wets when it falls at last.

TIFFANY & CO.

THE QUALITY IS PROVERBIAL

FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

With our own eyes we see the crew go silent, as if the strings life used to play on had been muted, as if flames were quietly taking their time about dying, in light airs.

Against this background, so intensely felt and rendered, Mr. Conrad paints three figures—Burns, the mate, all whose latent superstition is brought out by fever—Ransome, the born seaman, who has turned cook because he lives in terror that his heart-disease will kill him, and who puts this terror aside to help the captain, who does a sailor's hardest work when the crisis comes, does it without complaint, heroically, and whose fears take him again when the crisis is over. There is the young captain himself, on deck for seventeen days and almost without sleep. He has so much to do that he has no attention to spare for his own pluck. But he has plenty to spare for Ransome's. Mr. Conrad has given us two superb pictures of courage. We see Ransome's courage through the captain's eyes, and the captain's courage only in his deeds. Whether Ransome paid the full price for being a brave man Mr. Conrad does not tell us. But the captain's own experience was pure gain to his soul.

Is there any other reason, beside the one I have mentioned, why The Shadow Line seems slight, for Mr. Conrad? One other, perhaps. In the introduction, which takes up about a third of the book, we feel more and more uneasily the approach of sinister adventure. This feeling is suggested to us now here, now there, as only Mr. Conrad can do this kind of suggesting, and it grows a little too strong, a little too expectant, to be wholly satisfied by the simple and beautiful story that follows. This I say without forgetting the strange parallel between the mate's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

superstitious fear of his old captain, buried at sea, and the actual blow dealt the ship's company by that captain's dead hand. Q. K.

Contributors

to this issue

NORMAN ANGELL is the author of The Great Illusion and other books on international relations. He spent his youth in the western United States, has been in newspaper work both in this country and in England, has been associated with Lord Northcliffe in business, was general manager of the Paris Daily Mail, 1905-14.

H. SIDEBOTHAM is the military critic of the Manchester Guardian, and the editor of the Manchester Guardian's History of the War. He is a contributor to the Atlantic Monthly.

G. C. HENDERSON is a graduate of the Harvard Law School, was connected with the Federal Trade Commission and is now with the United States Shipping Board.

The Scudder School 816 W. 72nd Street, at Riverside Drive, overlooking the Hudson

For girls and mature young women. Day and boarding. *Myron T. Scudder, Pres.* A modern school actively meeting problems of today. Preparatory, Dramatics, Home Economics, Secretarial, etc. Red Cross and other preparedness features included. Gymnasium, games, swimming teams.

Address REGISTRAR, N. R. Scudder.

INTIMATE TEACHING BY SCHOLARLY MEN **Riverdale Country School**

A boarding and day school for boys in the open country at Riverdale-on-Hudson.

Address FRANK S. HACKETT, Headmaster
Riverdale-on-Hudson, New York City Tel. 123 Kingsbridge

Miss Bradford's and Miss Kennedy's School

for Girls, facing the Mount Holyoke College campus. College preparatory course, art, arts and crafts, music. Tennis, basketball, swimming, skating.

Address
MISS MARY A. BRADFORD, MISS VIRGINIA W. KENNEDY
Box 153, South Hadley, Massachusetts

250 acres of woodland, healthful surroundings; perfect sanitation; all forms of land and water sports; best of food; farming, construction work and photography; foreign language conversation; intimate companionship with camp councilors—these are some of the features that will make your boy's vacation a glorious one at

CAMP GREYLOCK

on Centre Lake, in the Heart of the Berkshires. Prospectus on request
GABRIEL R. MASON, Ph.D.
Principal, Public Schools, N. Y. City. 1107 Forest Ave., New York

CAMP WETUCKET—FOR GIRLS
15 years up
East Orleans, Mass. on Cape Cod

Sailing on Pleasant Bay, swimming, canoeing, tennis. Rates $135.00 for season July 1st to September 1st.

For single month of July, August or September pro rata. References required. For circular address:

HELEN C. VAN BUREN, 427 ELLISON ST., PATERSON, N. J.

PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL SERVICE

Eighth year begins Sept. 1st, 1917

Courses in Social Case Work, Industrial Problems, Public Hygiene, Social Statistics, Medical Social Service, Probation, etc. Well organized practice work under careful supervision.

For 1917-1918 Bulletin address

Registrar, 425 So. 15th Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

The "unexpected" quality of his mind, his power of using exact knowledge . . . . and his trenchant irony, all make one desire to give him the old-fashioned name of "genius."—Graham Wallas.

An Inquiry Into

THE NATURE OF PEACE

And the Terms of Its Perpetuation

By THORSTEIN VEBLEN

The price that must be paid for peace.
The chances of lasting peace.
Will class-war follow peace?

$2.00

The Macmillan Company, New York

What is the matter with the United States?

See Hubert Howe Bancroft's new book
"In These Latter Days"

Contents in part: Problems in Politics—Evolution upward and downward—Comparative Democracy—The War in Europe—Christianism and Civilization—Germany and Japan—The Picture Bride Infamy—China and the United States—Supremacy of the Pacific—Fallacies and Fantasies—Life's Complex Ways—The Psychology of Lying—Municipal Rule and Misrule—The Declination of Law—The Economics of Education—The Autocracy of Labor—Revival of Citizenship. At the bookstores, $2.

If you would know the true inwardness of the Japanese situation in California, read Griffing Bancroft's novel, "The Interlopers."

A GREAT BIOGRAPHY

The Authorized Life of

JAMES J. HILL

By Joseph Gilpin Pyle



Here is given complete for the first time the romantic life story of the great transportation genius and financier who opened the gateway to the Northwest.

2 vols. Illustrated. Boxed. Net, $5.00.
Ask your bookseller to show you this.
Published by
Doubleday, Page & Co., Garden City, N. Y.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED